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CHAPTER Ι 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A large body of evidence supports the hypothesis that financial development is a 
determining factor in economic growth, while less is known about the effect of financial 
integration on growth. My dissertation analyzes the relationship among financial 
integration, financial development and economic growth.  
The theory of financial integration and growth provides conflicting results about 
whether integration plays a positive role in real economic growth. Financial integration 
facilitates capital flows, leads to more efficient allocation of capital and allows 
international risk sharing. On the other hand, in the presence of weak institutions and 
informational asymmetries, financial integration may cause additional risks, thus putting 
financial stability in danger, particularly in developing countries.  
The first essay investigates the relation between financial integration and growth. I 
focus on two related questions:  The first is to ask whether financial integration is linked 
to growth in a statistical sense, and the second is to investigate which factors could help 
countries receive the benefits of financial integration if financial integration is good for 
growth. 
 The complicated issue in the financial integration literature is measuring the 
extent of integration. Among a wide array of possibilities, two major proxies are used: 1) 
government restrictions on capital flows and 2) measures of actual international capital 
flows.  The IMF’s measure of restrictions on openness provides an indicator of 
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government restrictions on international financial transactions that is a zero-one dummy. 
Although the IMF measure is a direct proxy for government impediments, it does not 
measure the magnitude of the integration. On the other hand, actual international capital 
flows are good signals of the extent of financial integration that vary over time (i.e., more 
actual international capital flows simply imply more openness). I therefore use actual 
international capital flows as proxies for financial integration. For many empirical studies, 
including mine, de facto measures are more suitable. For instance, some African 
countries have very few restrictions on capital account openness and would be considered 
open economy by the IMF measure, yet actual capital flows into those countries are small. 
Another example is China, where there are extensive restrictions on capital flows but 
actual flows are quite large.  
The potential problem with actual capital flows, of course, is that growth and 
capital flows may be influenced by the same underlying factors, such as policy changes. I 
apply the GMM method within panel data VAR systems to ameliorate these endogeneity 
problems. Using the panel data from 83 countries, I find that financial integration 
promotes economic growth. But I obtain the most interesting findings when I break total 
capital flows into inflows, outflows and their FDI and portfolio flow components. Total 
inflows and total outflows, however, play different roles in growth. Capital inflows lead 
to economic growth in emerging market economies, while outflows have positive effects 
on growth in developed countries and negative effects on growth in emerging markets. 
Interestingly, when further breaking down total capital flows into FDI and portfolio 
investment, I find that FDI is responsible for the positive and significant effects of 
inflows on growth in emerging markets, while portfolio outflows affect growth in 
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developed markets more than FDI outflows do. It is my belief that the positive effect of 
FDI in emerging markets is due to the lack of capital in those countries, while the fact 
that portfolio inflows do not affect growth can be attributed to weak financial institutions. 
Thus, my analysis offers insights into which forms of openness should be encouraged by 
policymakers at varying stages of economic development.  
The second essay examines the paths through which financial integration may 
affect growth. Macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation rate, budget deficits, 
exchange rate and the quality of the institution, also have an important impact on the link 
between financial development and growth. Inspired by previous studies, I examine the 
effect of financial integration on the link between financial development and growth 
using the rolling window technique. The rolling window method reveals the entire 
evolutionary process of the nexus based on the level of financial integration, rather than 
the threshold alone. Using a series of cross-country growth regressions with a rolling 
window of countries based on the level of integration, I find that financial development 
promotes economic growth when there is a moderate amount of financial integration. 
The effect of financial integration on the finance-growth nexus leads to further 
studies on financial development and financial integration. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2004) 
put forward the economic institutions hypothesis, which proposes that the existence of 
the economic institutions that help protect property rights are the fundamental cause of 
the differences in economic development. Deep fundamentals, such as a nation’s legal 
origin, the quality of the law enforcement and the political environment can affect 
financial development. Countries can be divided into four categories according to their 
legal origins: the English common law tradition and the French, German, and 
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Scandinavian civil law tradition. Based on previous studies, I examine the joint effect of 
the legal and political factors on financial development and financial integration, 
respectively. I find that an economy’s financial development and financial integration are 
different but related in that the deep fundamental conditions of a nation, such as legal 
origin and political factors, have an effect on both financial development and financial 
integration. However, they may have different effects on growth as argued in the 
literature.   
The third essay examines the development of equity markets. The explosive 
growth of equity markets in both emerging and developed markets in recent years has 
prompted both economists and policymakers to pay more attention to their impact on 
growth. The financial system consists of banks, non-bank financial institutions (such as 
insurance companies) and stock markets. The stock market allows companies to publicly 
issue and trade shares at a given price, which is another important source for companies 
to obtain external funds outside of the banking system. The most important advantage of 
investing in the stock market is liquidity: both the investors and entrepreneurs have the 
ability to sell the securities quickly and easily. Financial services provided by stock 
markets are thus different from the services provided by banks.  
In the more recent dataset (1990-2003), Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) found that 
the effect of financial development on growth is not as strong as it was in the previous 
period (1960-1989). However, they examined only the effect of bank sectors on growth. 
Inspired by their findings, I investigate the role of both stock markets and bank sectors in 
growth based on a larger and more recent dataset, 63 countries over the period 1990-2005. 
The empirical results suggest that, in the recent dataset, bank sectors do not have a 
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positive effect on growth, an outcome that is consistent with the findings in Rousseau and 
Wachtel (2011). However, stock market liquidity still has a positive and significant effect 
on growth when the total value traded is used as the measure. The other three measures of 
equity market development, including market capitalization, which measures the size of 
stock markets, do not have significant effects on growth. The findings imply that the 
liquidity of the stock markets is more important than the size of the market in 
accelerating economic growth. In addition, the results from the VAR models also suggest 
that the effect of stock market liquidity on growth is stronger in the more recent period 
than in the previous period 1980-1995.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Review of Literature 
The theory relating financial integration to growth provides conflicting results 
about whether integration can play a positive role in real economic growth. In the 
neoclassical model, financial integration facilitates capital flows, which enhance private 
savings and investments, thus freeing poor countries from a binding constraint on 
economic growth. On a global level, financial integration can strengthen the domestic 
financial system by leading to a more efficient allocation of capital, thereby promoting 
international risk-sharing. Obstfeld (1994) shows that international diversification of risks 
allows countries to shift away from low-return safe investments to high-return riskier 
ones, which can ultimately increase growth. Further, financial integration can reduce the 
volatility of consumption and raise welfare (Lucas 1987, Van Wincoop 1994, Jose De 
Gregorio 1999). For example, Epaulard and Pommeret (2005) obtain a significant welfare 
gain from capital market liberalization by calibrating a theoretical model of 32 
developing and emerging economies over the period 1990-1998. Specifically, they find 
that financial integration leads to about 0.3 percentage points of additional growth per 
year. In addition to the above benefits, capital flows such as foreign direct investment can 
help transfer advanced technology to developing countries, which can have a significant 
impact on productivity growth.   
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On the other hand, there are some arguments against financial integration. In the 
presence of weak institutions and information asymmetries, countries integrated with and 
open to the international capital market may lack the ability to absorb external capital into 
new investment. Financial integration may also increase risk, thus jeopardizing financial 
stability, particularly in developing countries without well-established financial systems 
and good policies to regulate them.  
Theoretical disagreements about financial integration and its benefits have led to a 
burgeoning yet inconclusive empirical literature. Empirical work by Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti (1995) and Kraay (1998) have not found a robust, long-term growth effect of the 
IMF’s measure of restrictions on openness. Recent studies by Levine and Edison (2002) 
examine an extensive array of financial integration measures, including capital flows, the 
IMF’s measure of restrictions on openness, and the Quinn’s measure of capital account 
restrictions, and find that each indicator has advantages and disadvantages. They also 
assess whether the effects of financial integration on growth depend on the level of 
economic development, financial depth, legal systems, government corruption, and 
macroeconomic policies such as inflation and fiscal imbalances. The conclusion they 
reach is that “financial integration does not accelerate economic growth, even when 
controlling for particular economic, financial institutional, and policy characteristics.” 
Moreover, De Gregorio (1999) reports an interesting result that financial integration has a 
positive effect on the financial depth of domestic economies, while showing no direct 
effect on economic growth.  
Unlike the theoretical results obtained by Epaulard and Pommeret (2005), 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) show that the welfare gains from capital market 
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liberalization are elusive and small when considered empirically.  Since consumption is 
regarded as a better measure of welfare than output, another related literature focuses on 
how financial integration affects fluctuations in consumption rather than welfare. Prasad, 
Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2007) argue that there is little evidence that financial integration 
has helped stabilize consumption. They find that low to moderate levels of financial 
integration may lead to greater volatility of consumption, but that volatility starts to 
decline once the level of integration crosses an upper threshold. From this point of view, 
financial instability and crises can be expected as growing pains in the process of 
financial globalization.
 1
 
 At the same time, Quinn (1997), Bekaert (2001) and Edwards (2001) find support 
for a relationship between openness and economic growth. Quinn and Toyoda (2008) 
show that capital account liberalization has an independent and positive role on growth in 
both developed and emerging markets. They reexamine some previous results, such as 
the findings of Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Edison et al. (2004), and argue that 
the controversial results of these earlier studies may partly result from measurement error 
in capital account variables, time periods studied, methodological choices, and the use of 
purchasing power parity adjusted data versus data on real growth in local currency units. 
Using pooled time-series, cross-sectional OLS and system GMM estimation on data from 
94 countries for the period from 1955 to 2004, they find support for a role of capital 
account liberalization on growth.  
Schularick and Steger (2006) shed new light on the nexus between financial 
integration and growth by examining evidence from the first era of financial globalization 
                                                          
1
 The World Economic Outlook (IMF 2002) also provides some evidence that financial integration is 
associated with a lower level of output volatility in developing countries. 
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from 1880 to 1912 using the data from 24 developing and developed countries. Using 
results from different estimation techniques, they support the studies that emphasize the 
virtues of international capital mobility. Edwards (2001) determines that the effect of the 
IMF measure on growth depends on the level of income. In other words, the IMF 
measure is negatively correlated with growth in wealthy countries, but positively 
correlated with growth in poor countries. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) focus on the 
link between financial integration and crises, and find that financial integration leads to 
more short-run, boom-bust cycles, but a more stable market in the long run.  
This paper takes inspiration from the rich literature that pioneered empirical 
studies in this area. In particular, based on the broad measures of financial integration in 
Levine (2002), this paper examines the contribution of total capital flows, total capital 
inflows and total capital outflows on financial integration and economic growth. All three 
measures can be further subdivided into two types of flows: foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and portfolio investment. In the light of the different roles that these forms may 
play in investment (see Mody and Murshid, 2005), this paper distinguishes between FDI 
and portfolio flows components of total flows and finds that FDI and portfolio flows have 
different effects on growth.   
That empirical research on the financial integration-growth nexus remains 
inconclusive is partly the result of the wide variety of approaches and econometric 
methodologies employed to study the issue. In this paper, I rely on the measures of 
financial integration and methodologies used in the literature that first motivated the 
empirical investigation of financial integration-growth nexus and financial development-
growth nexus. In particular, I rely on the works of Levine (2002) and Rousseau and 
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Wachtel (2000) respectively to execute a series of vector autoregressions (VARs) with 
panel data using an adaptation of the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique. 
For the sake of comparability with earlier cross-sectional studies, a dataset of 83 
countries from 1960 to 2008 is applied. These include 44 developed countries and 39 
emerging market countries.     
 
Data and Measures of Financial Integration 
To examine the relationship among economic growth, financial integration and 
financial development, I use per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) to measure 
economic performance. I also choose the most common measure of financial 
development, namely the stock of liquid liabilities (M3). This allows me to focus 
primarily on the growth effects of several different measures of financial integration. 
Both real GDP per capita and M3 are continuously available from the 2010 edition of 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators for all 83 countries.  
The complicated issue in the financial integration literature is, of course, 
measuring the extent of integration. Among a wide array of possibilities, two major 
proxies are used: 1) government restrictions on capital flows and 2) measures of actual 
international capital flows.  The IMF’s measure of restrictions on openness provides an 
indicator of government restrictions on international financial transactions that is a zero-
one dummy. Although the IMF measure is a direct proxy for government impediments, it 
does not measure the magnitude of the integration. On the other hand, actual international 
capital flows are good signals of the extent of financial integration that vary over time 
(i.e., more actual international capital flows simply imply more openness). This paper 
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therefore uses actual international capital flows as proxies for financial integration. The 
potential problem with actual capital flows, of course, is that growth and capital flows 
may be influenced by the same underlying factors, such as policy changes. I apply the 
GMM method within panel data VAR systems to ameliorate these endogeneity problems.  
The three major measures used in this paper are: 1) total flows of capital, which 
accumulates inflows and outflows for both FDI and portfolio investment; 2) total inflows 
of capital, which is the sum of FDI and portfolio inflows; and 3) total outflows of capital, 
which accumulates FDI and portfolio outflows. To examine the different effects of FDI 
and portfolio investment on economic growth, I also experiment with VAR systems that 
include the following four additional indicators: 1) FDI inflows, which equals FDI 
received by domestic countries; 2) portfolio debt investment (inflows), which represents 
foreign countries’ investment in domestic countries; 3) FDI outflows, such as domestic 
countries’ direct investment in foreign countries; and 4) portfolio equity investment 
(outflows), such as domestic countries’ portfolio investment in foreign countries. 
 I obtained the data for FDI and portfolio investment flows from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS), measured in current U.S. dollars. To express the 
data in real terms, I then deflated them using implicit price deflators for GDP computed 
from World Development Indicators. In the resulting tri-variate panel VARs, I use the 
logarithm of real value in per capita terms. The selection of countries and time period is 
based on the availability of data from the IMF source.  
Previous empirical studies suggest that financial integration has a positive effect 
on growth under certain conditions, such as a well-established financial system, higher 
levels of economic development and particular macroeconomic policies. I focus on 
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whether rich countries benefit more from such financial integration than poor ones. To 
investigate whether the financial integration-growth nexus depends on the level of 
income, I sort the full sample of 83 countries into two groups, with 44 developed 
countries and 39 emerging ones as classified by the World Bank.
2
  For comparability I 
run the tri-variate panel data vector autoregression (VAR) with GMM for all three groups.  
 
Methodology 
The econometric method used to assess the relationships between economic 
growth, financial development and financial integration is the panel data VAR, with an 
adaptation of the GMM technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano 
and Bover (1995).   
There are clear advantages in using panel data, which contains multiple 
observational units for multiple periods, allowing us to take advantage of information 
available in both the cross section and time series, especially when the time dimension is 
relatively small. Most of the recent empirical studies in the growth literature take non-
overlapping, five-year averages or ten-year averages of annual data. The average can 
characterize the steady state relationship between growth and other explanatory variables, 
yet may filter out some potentially useful information contained in the annual time series. 
                                                          
2
 The 44 developed countries are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United  
States, Uruguay and Venezuela. On the other hand, the 39 emerging market economies are 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana,  Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian 
Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo and Zimbabwe.  
13 
 
Further, five-year averaging also results in an 80 percent reduction of the number of the 
observations. The time period under analysis in this paper is from 1960 to 2008. There 
are 49 observations if annual data are used; however, there are 10 five-year averages 
observations and only 5 ten-year averages. The system GMM method further decreases 
the number of time series observations available for the estimation since differences and 
lags of the variables are involved. To maximize the use of the time and cross-country 
dimensions of available data sets, I therefore use a panel with annual data.  
In a panel of N countries for T years, the tri-variate vector autoregressions with 
fixed effects take the form 
,mfbyay ,,1
k
1j
k
1j
,1i,1jt,ij,1jt,i
k
1j
j,1jt,ij,1t,i titc  
 
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 


  tit                                (1c) 
where ti,y is the measure of economic growth (real GDP per capita) for country i at time t, 
ti,m is real liquid liabilities per capita (M3), and ti,f is a measure of financial integration 
(total real capital flows, inflows or outflows per capita), i is a country-specific fixed 
effect, t is a time-fixed effect, ti, is a random disturbance that approximates the normal 
distribution, and k is the lag order. I assume that the error term ti,  
is orthogonal to the 
fixed and time effects as well as the lagged values of the endogenous variables, and that 
they are not serially correlated. I use the fixed effects model instead of random effects 
since the i are likely to represent omitted country-specific characteristics that are 
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correlated with the other explanatory variables. Time effects account for trending 
behavior in the system variables. 
As to the variables on the right hand side of (1), all lagged values of the 
dependent variables are potentially endogenous. The presence of fixed effects in a data 
set with a small time dimension is also known to lead to biased estimates in the least 
squared dummy variable (LSDV) regression. System GMM estimation can overcome 
these problems. To do this, I write the regression equation as a dynamic panel model, 
take first-differences to remove unobserved time-invariant country-specific effects, and 
then instrument the independent variables using the predetermined lags of the system. 
After taking first-differences, the first equation in the VAR (1a) becomes 







k
1j
1,j-ti,j,11,jt,i
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j,11,jt,ij,1
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1-ti,ti, )(m)(fb)(ya)y-(y jtijtijti mcfy
 
                              
)()( 1,,1ti,1,1,1,1   titt  .                                                  
(2)                        
The other equations in the VAR system can be differenced similarly. In equation 
(2), the country dummies have been differenced out, and the only remaining endogeneity 
problem is caused by correlation between the first lags of the system variables and the 
new error term ).( 1,,  titi   
Under the assumption that the error term ti,  
is not serially 
correlated, the difference GMM dynamic panel estimator uses the following moment 
conditions to deliver the coefficient estimates: 
,0)](E[y 1,,j-t,i  titi         for T,3,.....,t2;j                                     (3) 
,0)](E[f 1,,j-t,i  titi        for T,3,.....,t2;j                   (4)                          
,0)](E[m 1,,j-t,i  titi        
for T.3,.....,t2;j 
                                   
(5)
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There are statistical shortcomings with this first-difference GMM estimator. 
Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that persistent 
explanatory variables over time can make lagged levels weak instruments for the 
regression equations in differences. In small samples, such weak instruments can bias the 
coefficients. To reduce the potential biases and imprecision with the first-difference 
estimator, I use the system GMM estimator that combines the regression in differences 
with a regression in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Lagged differences of the related explanatory variables are used as instruments for the 
regression in levels, while lags of the related explanatory variables are instruments for the 
regression in differences shown above. 
 
The additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are: 
 
,0)]()E[(y ,1,j-t,i   tiijtiy         for j=1                                             (6) 
 
,0)]()E[(f ,1,j-t,i   tiijtif   
      for j=1                                             (7) 
 
,0)]()E[(m ,1,j-t,i   tiijtim         
for j=1.                                            (8) 
Two types of test are used to examine the consistency of the system GMM 
estimator. The first type includes the Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identification, 
which test the joint validity of the instruments by examining the moment conditions used 
in the estimation.
3
 The null hypothesis is that the instrument set is valid and that the 
model is not over-identified. The second type is the AR test, which examines whether 
there is serial correlation in the error terms. The test depends on large N and relatively 
                                                          
3
 Only the results of Sargan tests are reported in this paper, since Hansen test can be greatly 
weakened by the proliferation of instrument. 
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small T and has a null hypothesis of no serial correlation. I check for both first-order and 
second-order serial correlation.  
 
Empirical Results 
1. Economic Growth, Financial Integration and Financial Development 
Treating total flows of capital, total inflows of capital, and total outflows of 
capital as three different measures of financial integration, I proceed to estimate three 
VAR models. The results for these models are shown in table 1, table 2 and table 3, 
respectively. As mentioned in section 2, to investigate whether the financial integration-
growth nexus depends on the level of income, I sort the full sample (83 countries) into 
developed countries (44 countries) and emerging market economies (39 countries). For 
the sake of comparability, each table contains a panel corresponding to each group.  
To indicate the direction of the causal effects, I report the sum of the coefficients 
on the k lags of each of the explanatory variables.  Two lags are included in each VAR. 
The selection of the number of lags is based on the results of a series of nested likelihood 
ratio tests. The Sargan test examines the joint validity of the instruments, and the AR 
tests examine the serial correlation of error terms. Those two tests together determine the 
consistency of the GMM estimators. Crucially, second-order serial correlation should be 
absent and the instrument set should not be over-identified.  
Table 1 reports the relationship among real GDP per capita, total flows of capital 
and liquid liabilities. The cumulative coefficients on the two lags of the explanatory 
variables are reported, with the p-value of the joint test for block exogeneity in 
parentheses. The cumulative coefficients on total flows in equation 1 are positive and  
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Table 1. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Total 
Capital Flows and Liquid Liabilities (M3), 1960-2008 
Countries Equation 
Dependent 
variable 
GDP 
Total 
flows 
Liquid 
liabilities 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan 
Full sample 1 GDP 0.9907** 0.0019** 0.0071* 0.0000 0.2880 
   (0.0000) (0.0057) (0.0050) 0.6770  
  
      
 
 2 Total 0.2762** 0.8049** 0.0128 0.0000 0.8580 
  
flows (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4829) 0.6730  
  
      
 
3 Liquid 0.0388** 0.0016 0.9663** 0.0000 0.2530 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.3423) (0.0000) 0.2510  
  
      
Developed 1 GDP 0.9916** 0.0032* 0.0019 0.0000 0.5040 
  
 (0.0000) (0.0995) (0.6622) 0.3850  
  
      
 
 2 Total 0.3430** 0.7771** -0.0155 0.0000 0.8730 
  
flows (0.0009) (0.0000) (0.7723) 0.4160  
  
      
 
3 Liquid 0.0566** 0.0045 0.9476** 0.0000 0.5330 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.2007) (0.0000) 0.2280  
  
      
Emerging 1 GDP 0.9847** 0.0009 0.0123** 0.0000 0.2000 
  
 (0.0000) (0.4556) (0.0029) 0.1220  
  
      
 
2 Total 0.1679 0.7870** 0.0703 0.0000 0.3200 
  
flows (0.1586) (0.0000) (0.1029) 0.4870  
  
      
 
3 Liquid 0.0150* 0.0001 0.9916** 0.0000 0.4820 
  
liabilities (0.0052) (0.9635) (0.0000) 0.8810  
          
Note: The table reports cumulative coefficients from system GMM estimation for two lags of 
each system variable in a three-variable VAR, with the p-values for Granger-causality tests in 
parentheses. The symbols * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent 
levels, respectively. P-values for the Sargan and AR test results are reported in the last two 
columns. Results for the AR (1) test are in the first row, and the results for the AR (2) test are in 
the second row for each equation. Year dummies are included in the equations but are not 
reported. GDP, total capital flows, and M3 are all in logs of per capita constant 2000 U.S. dollars.   
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significant for the full sample and for the developed countries, yet the positive cumulative 
coefficient on total flows for emerging countries is not statistically significant. This 
suggests that the developed countries benefit more from the total capital flows than do the 
emerging market economies. In addition, the coefficients on liquid liabilities in equation 
1 for the full sample and the emerging countries are positive and significant, while they 
are not significant for the developed ones. The results are consistent with the leading role 
for financial factors in output in the extant literature. The Sargan and AR test results are 
reported in the last two columns. The Sargan test indicates that the instruments are valid 
and that the specifications are not over-identified. By construction, the differenced error 
term could be first-order serially correlated, while second-order serial correlation should 
be absent. AR (1) test has a p-value of zero and AR (2) test has a p-value of 0.677 for 
equation 1 in the full sample, which indicate that the model cannot be rejected due to 
serial correlation.  
As to equation 2 and equation 3, which use total capital flows and liquid liabilities 
(M3) as the dependent variables, real GDP per capita has a positive and significant effect 
on total capital flows in the full sample and for the developed countries. There is no 
evidence of feedback, however, from real GDP per capita to total capital flows in 
emerging market countries. In equation 3, real GDP per capita enters the equation with a 
positive sum of coefficients for all three groups of countries. This outcome suggests the 
presence of feedback from GDP to financial development. Because these equations also 
pass the specification tests defined above, I do not reject the validity of the specification. 
Figure 1 reports selected impulse response functions with a ten-year horizon for 
the above system. The solid line is the mean impulse response and the dotted lines are  
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Panel a: Full sample of countries 
 
 
 
Panel b: Developed countries  
 
 
 
Panel c: Emerging markets 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Selected Impulse Responses for Panel VAR Systems with GDP, Financial Development and Total 
Capital Flows, 1960-2008 
Note: Panels a, b and c show selected responses in three-variable systems for the full sample of countries, developed 
countries and emerging markets, respectively. In each panel, the graph on the left shows the responses of real GDP per 
capita to a one unit shock in total flows per capita, while the graph on the right shows the responses of total flows per 
capita to a one unit shock in real GDP per capita. Based on the Monte Carlo integration technique described in Doan 
(1995), the thick solid lines show the mean impulse responses that result from 1,000 random draws from the estimated 
distribution of the coefficients in each system, and the dotted lines are one standard deviation bands.   
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one standard error bands. For the full sample (panel a), the response of real GDP per 
capita to a one unit shock in the log of total flows per capita is substantial. Specifically, 
the cumulative effect rises quickly for 3 years before gradually leveling off, with the 
lower standard error band remaining above zero for 6 years. In addition, the cumulative 
response of output to a one unit shock in capital flows for developed countries (panel b) 
is larger and is sustained longer than the response for emerging markets (panel c). This is 
consistent with the Granger-causality tests. Meanwhile, the responses of total flows to a 
one unit shock in real GDP confirm the presence of feedback from output to total flows in 
developed countries but not in emerging market economies. It thus seems that the 
relationship between total capital flows and output in emerging market economies is uni-
directional.  
In tables 2 and 3, I repeat the analysis for total inflows and total outflows of 
capital respectively. Again, both two systems pass the specifications tests defined above. 
As in the results obtained in table 1, financial development has a leading role in economic 
growth for the full sample and the emerging market economies, and real GDP per capita 
has feedback to financial development for all three country groups. However, total capital 
inflows and total capital outflow play different roles with respect to real output. 
In table 2, the cumulative effects of total inflows on real GDP per capita are 
positive and significant for the full sample and emerging market economies, but are not 
significant for the group of developed countries.  Most emerging market countries suffer 
from lack of capital. Capital inflows can increase the availability of the capital to firms, 
thus freeing poor countries from a binding constraint on economic growth. Capital 
inflows can also improve the function of the financial system and help transfer advanced  
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Table 2. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Total 
Capital Inflows and Liquid Liabilities (M3), 1960-2008 
Countries Equation 
Dependent 
variable 
GDP 
Total 
inflows 
Liquid 
liabilities 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan 
Full sample 1 GDP 0.9910** 0.0017** 0.0071** 0.0000 0.3630 
  
 (0.0000) (0.0113) (0.0046) 0.8630  
  
      
 
 2 Total 0.3666** 0.7348** -0.0131 0.0000 0.2860 
  
inflows (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8989) 0.2150  
  
      
 
3 Liquid 0.0354** 0.0021 0.9685** 0.0000 0.7020 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.3420) (0.0000) 0.2530  
  
      
Developed  1 GDP 0.9940** 0.0012 0.0024 0.0000 0.6840 
  
 (0.0000) (0.4562) (0.6142) 0.2870  
  
      
 
2 Total 0.3636** 0.7825** -0.0673 0.0000 0.7340 
  
inflows (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2639) 0.6040  
  
      
 
3 Liquid 0.0558** 0.0020 0.9519** 0.0000 0.7980 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.4129) (0.0000) 0.2500  
  
      
Emerging  1 GDP 0.9801** 0.0017** 0.0142** 0.0000 0.0760 
  
 (0.0000) (0.0264) (0.0015) 0.4160  
  
      
 
 2 Total 0.2244 0.7186** 0.0932* 0.0000 0.1150 
  
inflows (0.1428) (0.0000) (0.0903) 0.1480  
  
      
 
 3 Liquid 0.0158** 0.0016 0.9895** 0.0000 0.6450 
  
liabilities (0.0069) (0.8312) (0.0000) 0.6930  
                
Note: See note to Table 1. GDP, total capital inflows, and M3 are all in logs of per capita 
constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  
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Table 3. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Total 
Capital Outflows and Liquid Liabilities (M3), 1960-2008 
Countries Equation 
Dependent 
variable 
GDP 
Total 
outflows 
Liquid 
liabilities 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan 
Full sample  1 GDP 0.9960** 0.0003** 0.0044** 0.0000 0.3200 
   
(0.0000) (0.0449) (0.0239) 0.2590  
   
     
 
 2 Total 0.3822** 0.7561** 0.0652 0.0000 0.9590 
  
outflows (0.0046) (0.0000) (0.3041) 0.4950  
   
     
 
 3 Liquid 0.0515** -0.0014 0.9596** 0.0000 0.6140 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.7204) (0.0000) 0.2920  
   
     
Developed  1 GDP 0.9921** 0.0044** -0.0014 0.0000 0.4030 
   
(0.0000) (0.0142) (0.3454) 0.9210  
       
 
 
 2 Total 0.4397** 0.7231** 0.1016 0.0000 0.5780 
  
outflows (0.0374) (0.0000) (0.2583) 0.8690  
       
 
 
 3 Liquid 0.0735** 0.0075* 0.9302** 0.0010 0.7420 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.0910) (0.0000) 0.2670  
       
 
Emerging  1 GDP 0.9896** -0.0017* 0.0103** 0.0000 0.1440 
   
(0.0000) (0.0672) (0.0094) 0.3080  
       
 
 
 2 Total -0.0809 0.7137** 0.2693 0.0000 0.7970 
  
outflows (0.8773) (0.0000) (0.1759) 0.3730  
       
 
 
 3 Liquid -0.0023** -0.0063* 1.0022** 0.0000 0.0330 
  
liabilities (0.0252) (0.0862) (0.0000) 0.7460  
                
Note: See note to Table 1. GDP, total capital outflows, and M3 are all in logs of per 
capita constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  
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technologies and skills to emerging market countries. However, capital inflows do not 
have a significant impact on real GDP per capita in developed market economies. Rather, 
capital market openness benefits these economies through the international risk-sharing 
channel instead of the investment channel. Capital inflows to developed countries lead to 
more efficient allocation of resources and serve to diversify investments. In summary, 
real GDP per capita has a positive and significant effect on the total capital inflows in the 
full sample and the developed countries.  
As to the measure of capital outflows, total outflows have a positive and 
significant effect on real GDP per capita for both the full sample and the developed 
countries, while the total outflows have a negative and significant effect on real output in 
the emerging market countries. As a consequence of the opposite sign of the coefficient 
on total outflows for developed countries and emerging market countries, the overall 
effect of outflows on growth in the full sample is much smaller than the effect of total 
capital outflows on growth in the developed countries. The positive effect of total 
outflows suggests that developed market economies could benefit from the outflows 
since capital tends to flow to more productive uses, which provide a higher rate of return 
irrespective of location. 
On the other hand, capital outflows harm emerging market economies due to the 
lack of capital in those countries. Capital outflows from emerging market economies are 
certainly feasible. For instance, countries with weak financial systems and institutions 
cannot provide a sound environment with sufficient protection for investors, a situation 
that may result in capital outflows from capital-scarce countries to capital-abundant 
countries with better financial systems and policies.  
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Panel a: Full sample of countries 
 
 
 
Panel b: Developed countries 
 
 
 
 Panel c: Emerging markets 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Selected Impulse Responses for Panel VAR Systems with GDP, Financial 
Development and Total Capital Inflows, 1960-2008 
 
Note: See note to Fig. 1. This set of impulse responses uses total capital inflows as the measure of 
financial integration.  
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Panel a: Full sample of countries 
 
 
 
Panel b: Developed countries 
 
  
 
Panel c: Emerging markets 
 
 
Fig. 3. Selected Impulse Responses for Panel VAR Systems with GDP, Financial 
Development and Total Capital Outflows, 1960-2008 
 
Note: See note to Fig. 1. This set of impulse responses uses total capital outflows as the measure 
of financial integration.  
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Figures 2 and 3 report selected impulse response functions with a ten-year horizon 
for the systems with total inflows and total outflows. For the full sample (panel a), the 
response of real GDP per capita to a one unit shock in the log of total inflows per capita 
is also substantial and gradually leveling off after 3 years. In addition, the cumulative 
response of output to a one unit shock in capital inflows for emerging markets (panel c) is 
larger than the response for developed countries (panel b). These responses show that 
total inflows have a greater effect on GDP per capita in emerging market economies than 
in developed ones. On the other hand, the responses of output to total outflows in figure 3 
indicate that total outflows have a positive and sustained effect on GDP in developed 
countries and a negative role on GDP in emerging market economies, which further 
confirm the previous findings. Meanwhile, the responses of total inflows and total 
outflows to a one unit shock in real GDP confirm that the relationship between total 
inflows (or total outflows) and output in emerging market economies is uni-directional.  
2. Different Effects of FDI and Portfolio Investment on Growth 
After examining the different roles of capital inflows and outflows, I further break 
down total capital flows into four categories to analyze the different functions of FDI and 
portfolio investment: FDI inflows, portfolio debt investment (inflows), FDI outflows and 
portfolio equity investment (outflows). Thus, four VAR systems are estimated and each 
of them includes one of the above categories.  
Tables 4 to 7 present the results for the four VAR systems. As in the previous 
analysis, two lags are included in each VAR system. The cumulative coefficients on the 
two lags of the explanatory variables are reported, with the p-values of the joint 
significance tests for block exogeneity in parentheses. Again, all the systems pass the 
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specification tests defined above, with only a few exceptions. My findings are consistent 
with the recent literature: Financial development has a positive effect on growth in the 
full sample and emerging market countries; and real GDP per capita feeds back into 
financial development for all three country groups.  
The regression results for FDI inflows and portfolio debt investment (inflows) 
show that, for the full sample and emerging market economies, FDI inflows are 
responsible for the positive and significant effect of inflows on real GDP per capita. On 
the other hand, there is no evidence that portfolio inflows have an important effect on 
GDP for all three groups. That the magnitude of the effect of FDI inflows on output is 
close to the effect of total inflows on output further confirms the above finding. Portfolio 
inflows do not have an effect on growth in emerging market economies due to the lack of 
a well-established financial system and good macroeconomic policies. The ability of 
emerging market countries to absorb portfolio inflows is limited. Meanwhile, the 
situation of developed countries holding portfolio debt for risk-sharing purposes may lead 
to the consequence that portfolio inflows do not affect real output. These findings are 
consistent with the previous results obtained for the system with total capital inflows, 
which show that the effects of total inflows on real GDP per capita are positive and 
significant for the full sample and emerging market economies, but not significant for the 
developed countries. 
In addition, real GDP has positive feedback on FDI inflows for both the full 
sample and the developed countries, but no feedback for emerging market countries. On 
the contrary, real output has a positive effect on portfolio investment inflows for all three 
groups. These findings are the consequence of the different characteristics of FDI and  
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Table 4. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, FDI Inflows 
and Liquid Liabilities (M3), 1960-2008 
Countries Equation 
Dependent 
variable 
GDP 
FDI 
inflows 
Liquid 
liabilities 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan 
Full sample  1 GDP 0.9922** 0.0017** 0.0067** 0.0000 0.1120 
   
(0.0000) (0.0207) (0.0132) 0.9100  
       
 
 
 2 FDI 0.2424** 0.7808** -0.0127 0.0000 0.3490 
  
inflows (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.9067) 0.8430  
       
 
 
 3 Liquid 0.0367** 0.0009 0.9692** 0.0000 0.4610 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.6979) (0.0000) 0.2430  
       
 
Developed  1 GDP 0.9944** 0.0015 0.0025 0.0000 0.2510 
   
(0.0000) (0.1996) (0.5556) 0.1330  
       
 
 
 2 FDI 0.2583** 0.7951** -0.0743** 0.0000 0.9140 
  
inflows (0.0022) (0.0000) (0.0134) 0.4590  
       
 
 
 3 Liquid 0.0608** -0.0021 0.9516** 0.0000 0.3890 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.7630) (0.0000) 0.2430  
       
 
Emerging  1 GDP 0.9808** 0.0017* 0.0135** 0.0000 0.0210 
   
(0.0000) (0.0939) (0.0018) 0.2480  
       
 
 
 2 FDI 0.2105 0.7444** 0.0705* 0.0000 0.2200 
  
inflows (0.1865) (0.0000) (0.0704) 0.4840  
       
 
 
 3 Liquid 0.0160** 0.0041 0.9878** 0.0000 0.9290 
  
liabilities (0.0031) (0.4923) (0.0000) 0.5130  
                
Note: See note to Table 1. GDP, FDI inflows, and M3 are all in logs of per capita constant 
2000 U.S. dollars.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Table 5. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Portfolio 
Inflows and Liquid Liabilities (M3), 1960-2008 
Countries Equation 
Dependent 
variable 
GDP 
Portfolio 
inflows 
Liquid 
liabilities 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan 
Full sample 1 GDP 0.9950** 0.0004 0.0045* 0.0000 0.2620 
   
(0.0000) (0.5332) (0.0623) 0.5590  
       
 
 
2 Portfolio 0.6954** 0.5372** 0.0657 0.0000 0.8390 
  
inflows (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.8112) 0.2340  
       
 
 
3 Liquid 0.0439** 0.0005 0.9620** 0.0000 0.2320 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.7721) (0.0000) 0.2290  
       
 
Developed 1 GDP 0.9969** 0.0000 0.0013 0.0000 0.4370 
   
(0.0000) (0.5980) (0.8199) 0.1320  
       
 
 
2 Portfolio 0.7785** 0.6013** -0.0997 0.0000 0.4070 
  
inflows (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.6404) 0.2180  
       
 
 
3 Liquid 0.0716** -0.0004 0.9448** 0.0010 0.4710 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.8959) (0.0000) 0.2280  
       
 
Emerging 1 GDP 0.9860** 0.0001 0.0124** 0.0040 0.2200 
   
(0.0000) (0.9140) (0.0009) 0.5320  
       
 
 
2 Portfolio 0.0332** 0.6630** 0.3082 0.0010 0.3870 
  
inflows (0.0194) (0.0000) (0.5960) 0.8350  
       
 
 
3 Liquid -0.0076* -0.0022 1.0022** 0.0010 0.2050 
  
liabilities (0.0603) (0.8409) (0.0000) 0.8600  
  
      
 
Note: See note to Table 1. GDP, portfolio inflows, and M3 are all in logs of per capita 
constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  
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Table 6. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, FDI Outflows 
and Liquid Liabilities (M3), 1960-2008 
Countries Equation 
Dependent 
variable 
GDP 
FDI 
outflows 
Liquid 
liabilities 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan 
Full sample  1 GDP 0.9978** -0.0007 0.0045** 0.0000 0.8950 
   
(0.0000) (0.1363) (0.0435) 0.3100  
       
 
 
 2 FDI 0.7197** 0.6304** -0.0513 0.0000 0.9890 
  
outflows (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.1602) 0.0090  
       
 
 
 3 Liquid 0.0449** -0.0022 0.9660** 0.0000 0.2870 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.3961) (0.0000) 0.3460  
       
 
Developed  1 GDP 0.9988** 0.0016 -0.0013 0.0000 0.7510 
   
(0.0000) (0.1232) (0.3224) 0.9680  
       
 
 
 2 FDI 0.6307** 0.7193** -0.0579** 0.0000 0.6650 
  
outflows (0.0023) (0.0000) (0.0441) 0.4290  
       
 
 
 3 Liquid 0.0785** 0.0027 0.9363** 0.0010 0.8800 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.1473) (0.0000) 0.3200  
       
 
Emerging  1 GDP 0.9862** -0.0022 0.0119** 0.0060 0.0980 
   
(0.0000) (0.6581) (0.0005) 0.2600  
       
 
 
 2 FDI 0.0828 0.6777** 0.1758 0.0040 0.3580 
  
outflows (0.7015) (0.0000) (0.1945) 0.1860  
       
 
 
 3 Liquid -0.0037 -0.0065* 1.0067** 0.0030 0.5140 
  
liabilities (0.1014) (0.0838) (0.0000) 0.3430  
    
 
      
 
 
Note: See note to Table 1. GDP, FDI outflows, and M3 are all in logs of per capita constant 
2000 U.S. dollars.   
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Table 7. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Portfolio 
Outflows and Liquid Liabilities (M3), 1960-2008 
Countries Equation 
Dependent 
variable 
GDP 
Portfolio 
outflows 
Liquid 
liabilities 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
Sargan 
Full sample 1 GDP 0.9979** 0.0003 0.0025 0.0000 0.7200 
   
(0.0000) (0.1597) (0.1332) 0.2350  
       
 
 
2 Portfolio 0.1603 0.6584** 0.3499** 0.0000 0.1070 
  
outflows (0.5890) (0.0000) (0.0114) 0.0590  
       
 
 
3 Liquid 0.0269** 0.0003 0.9775** 0.0000 0.6580 
  
liabilities (0.0000) (0.2568) (0.0000) 0.4700  
       
 
Developed 1 GDP 0.9950** 0.0016** 0.0004 0.0000 0.6040 
   
(0.0000) (0.0243) (0.5584) 0.3790  
       
 
 
2 Portfolio 0.1139 0.6493** 0.3704** 0.0000 0.1780 
  
outflows (0.7743) (0.0000) (0.0214) 0.0180  
       
 
 
3 Liquid 0.0320** 0.0045* 0.9679** 0.0010 0.1860 
  
liabilities (0.0003) (0.0840) (0.0000) 0.2610  
       
 
Emerging 1 GDP 0.9865** -0.0028 0.0111** 0.0010 0.1140 
   
(0.0000) (0.1397) (0.0151) 0.1890  
       
 
 
2 Portfolio -0.5352 0.5818** 0.7394** 0.0010 0.1400 
  
outflows (0.3280) (0.0000) (0.0026) 0.8690  
       
 
 
3 Liquid 0.0106 -0.0044 0.9930** 0.0010 0.2280 
  
liabilities (0.1196) (0.4028) (0.0000) 0.4420  
  
      
 
Note: See note to Table 1. GDP, portfolio outflows, and M3 are all in logs of per capita 
constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  
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portfolio inflows. The investors of FDI are actively involved in their investments. They 
make strategic decisions, such as quantities of production and cost control, which allow 
them to closely monitor and safeguard their investments. On the other hand, the portfolio 
investors, who purchase the stocks of a number of companies, are not actively involved in 
the management and everyday business of the companies. Thus, portfolio inflows are 
more closely related to the level of real GDP than FDI inflows, and it is not surprising to 
see emerging countries with a low level of output receive FDI from other countries.  
The results for FDI outflows and portfolio outflows are included in Tables 6 and 7.  
FDI outflows do not have a significant effect on growth for all three country groups, 
while portfolio outflows accelerate economic growth only in developed economies. This 
outcome suggests that for developed countries, portfolio investment outflows that serve 
the purpose of diversification can benefit these economies more than FDI outflows.  
Moreover, real GDP per capita has an effect on FDI outflows for the full sample 
and the developed countries, but no effect on portfolio outflows for all three country 
groups. This outcome suggests that only the developed countries with a higher output 
level have the desire and the ability to invest abroad, while all the countries, regardless of 
income level, have the motivation to spread risk through portfolio investment. 
Figure 4 reports the selected impulse response functions with a ten-year horizon 
for the system with FDI inflows. For the full sample (panel a), the response of real GDP 
per capita to a one unit shock in the log of FDI inflows per capita is positive. In addition, 
the cumulative response of output to a one unit shock in FDI inflows for developed 
countries (panel b) is smaller, yet lasts longer than the response for emerging markets 
(panel c), which persist for only 2 years. The responses further support the  
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Panel a: Full sample of countries 
 
 
 
Panel b: Developed countries 
 
 
 
Panel c: Emerging markets 
 
  
 
Fig. 4. Selected Impulse Responses for Panel VAR Systems with GDP, Financial 
Development and FDI Inflows, 1960-2008 
 
Note: See note to Fig. 1. This set of impulse responses uses total capital outflows as the measure 
of financial integration.  
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finding that FDI inflows are responsible for the positive and significant effect of inflows 
on real GDP per capita in emerging market economies, while the effect of FDI inflows in 
developed countries is not statistically significant. Further, the responses of real GDP to 
FDI inflows indicate that GDP has positive feedback for developed countries, and there 
seems to be no feedback for emerging market countries. The impulse responses for 
portfolio inflows, FDI outflows and portfolio outflows are not reported in this paper, 
since no important findings were obtained from those systems.  
3. Discussion 
My findings support the link between financial integration and economic growth, 
and are consistent with the work of Quinn (1997), Bekaert (2001) and Edwards (2001). 
The three measures of financial integration that I use are based on those developed by 
Levine and Edison (2002), yet they reach a different conclusion about the influence of 
financial integration on growth. Levine and Edison argue that “financial integration does 
not accelerate economic growth, even when controlling for particular economic, financial 
institutional, and policy characteristics.” The different findings in this paper could be 
attributed to the following three reasons. First, the dependent variables used in the OLS, 
two-stage least squares regression and the system GMM panel regression in Levine (2002) 
represent the growth rate of real GDP per capita. In contrast, the dependent variables in 
the VAR system with GMM method in this paper represent real GDP per capita since I 
use real per capita value in levels for all three variables in the VAR system. This means 
that I focus more on transitional dynamics between steady states than growth rates in the 
steady states.   
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Secondly, Levine and Edison (2002) take non-overlapping five-year averages of 
the annual data for all the variables in the system GMM regression. An average can 
characterize the steady state relationship between growth and other explanatory variables 
yet may remove some potentially useful information available in the time series. Five-
year averaging also results in an 80 percent reduction of the number of the observations. 
There are other works that use annual data in a manner similar to mine, such as Rousseau 
and Wachtel (2000), and Baltagi, Demetriades, and Law (2007).  
Finally, a broader data set of 83 countries during the time period from 1960 to 
2008 has been applied in this paper, compared to the dataset for 57 countries during the 
period from 1976 to 2000.  
 
Summary of the Chapter 
Utilizing three different measures of international financial integration for 83 
countries for the time period from 1960 to 2008, and applying the panel data VAR model 
with an adaptation of the GMM method, I find that financial integration promotes real 
economic growth. The three measures of financial integration, however, have different 
effects on growth. First, the effect of total capital flows on growth depends on the level of 
income. Specifically, developed countries benefit more from total capital flows than 
emerging market countries do. Second, total capital inflows have a positive effect on 
growth for emerging market countries, but not for developed ones. Lastly, capital 
outflows play opposite roles in the financial integration-growth nexus for developed 
countries and emerging market countries. Developed countries seem to take advantage of 
capital outflows, while emerging markets that lack capital are harmed by them.  
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When further breaking down the components of total capital flows into four 
categories, I find out that FDI is responsible for the positive and significant effect of 
inflows on growth in emerging market countries, while portfolio inflows do not have 
significant effects on growth for all three country groups. Meanwhile, FDI outflows do 
not have significant effects on growth for all three country groups, while portfolio 
outflows promote output gains only in developed economies.  This result suggests that, 
for developed countries, portfolio investment outflows that serve the purpose of 
diversification can benefit these economies more than FDI outflows. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND THE FINANCE-GROWTH NEXUS 
 
Introduction 
Recent cross-country investigations of the finance-growth nexus show that 
financial development is an important determinant of long run economic growth (Levine, 
2000, 2003; Rousseau, 1998, 2000). However, the effect of financial integration on 
growth is still ambiguous. Edison (2002) argues that “the financial integration does not 
accelerate economic growth, even when controlling for particular economic, financial 
institutional, and policy characteristics.” On the other hand, by reexamining some of the 
previous studies Quinn and Toyoda (2008) show that capital account liberalization 
promotes growth in both developed and developing countries.    
Rajan and Zingales (2003) propose an interest group theory, which predicts that 
the incumbents could fight against financial development. However, this opposition will 
be ameliorated when an economy has both an open trade market and capital market. They 
suggest that neither trade openness alone nor capital market openness alone is likely to 
successfully promote financial development. The contribution of this theory in Rajan and 
Zingales is important, but the evidence is limited.  Due to a limited availability of data 
they include only the twenty-four mostly industrialized countries in their analysis. It thus 
is impossible for them to take full advantage of the time series model and panel data 
model in explaining the impact of openness on financial development. Utilizing panel 
data and dynamic estimation techniques, Demetriades (2008) investigates the relationship 
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among trade openness, financial market openness and financial development. 
Demetriades reach the conclusion that both types of openness foster financial 
development, a finding which is consistent with the hypothesis in Rajan and Zingales 
(2003). However, he suggests that opening one market without the other will not 
necessarily have a negative impact on financial sector development, which is a 
conclusion not shared by Rajan and Zingales. 
The findings that financial development influences economic growth bring out a 
new question: Why do countries vary across the degree of financial development? 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) find that the finance- growth nexus in the recent period is 
not as strong as in the 1960-1989 periods. One possible reason they suggest for this 
change is the global liberalization in the 1980s since it could have lead to rapid financial 
development in countries that lacked a well-established financial system to regulate the 
cross-country financial flows. It is important to note that economic development and 
financial institutions can affect the influence of financial development on growth. The 
efficiency of the financial system in richer countries is relevant to economic growth. For 
this reason, some studies distinguish developed and developing countries when 
examining the finance-growth nexus.  
Macroeconomic indicators, such as the inflation rate, budget deficits, the 
exchange rate and the quality of the institution, also have an important impact on the link 
between financial development and growth. Rousseau and Yilmazkuday (2009) examine 
how inflation rate affects the finance-growth nexus. Using both an econometric and a 
graphical method, they reach the conclusion that a combination of a higher level of 
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financial development and a lower inflation rate is associated with rapid economic 
growth.  
Inspired by those previous studies, this paper examines the effect of financial 
integration on the link between financial development and growth using the rolling 
window technique. The rolling window method shows the entire evolutionary process of 
the nexus based on the level of financial integration, rather than the threshold alone. I 
find that financial development promotes economic growth when there is a moderate 
amount of financial integration. The effect of financial integration on the finance-growth 
nexus leads to further examination of financial development and financial integration in 
the second part of this paper. 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2004) put forward the economic institutions hypothesis, 
which proposes that the existence of the economic institutions that help protect property 
rights are the fundamental cause of the differences in economic development. Another 
stream of literature led by the work of La Porta et al. (1997) proposes that “deeper” 
fundamentals, such as a nation’s legal origin and the quality of its law enforcement, can 
affect financial development. They distinguish countries on the basis of their legal origins 
into four categories: the English common law tradition, and the French, German and 
Scandinavian civil law tradition. English common law is first created by judges and later 
incorporated into legislature. On the other hand, French, German and Scandinavian civil 
law are mostly made by scholars and legislators. Among the four legal origins, English 
common law is considered to provide the best protection for both shareholders and 
creditors. French law is the most rigidly codified and thus provides the least protection. 
The protection provided by German civil law and Scandinavian civil law lies somewhere 
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between English common law and French civil law. Using the data from 49 countries, La 
Porta et al. (1997) reaches the conclusion that the countries with better legal investor 
protection and better law enforcement, i.e., English common law, have relative larger and 
broader capital markets. Levine (1998) also assesses the effect of legal origin on financial 
redevelopment, and finds that legal origin influences economic growth by forming the 
economy’s financial system. 
Bordo and Rousseau (2006) add a nation’s political environment into the 
economic institution hypothesis by including it into the deep fundamental conditions 
which could affect economic development. They analyze how deep fundamentals, such 
as legal origins and political environment, impact the development of finance and growth 
with a cross-section dataset for the period 1880-1997. Their conclusions about the 
relationship between a country’s legal origin and financial development are largely 
consistent with La Porta et al. (1997). However, they consider the relationship as less 
persistent than in the La Porta et al. framework. They find that “proportional 
representation election systems, frequent elections, universal female suffrage, and 
infrequent revolutions or coups seem linked to larger financial sectors and higher 
conditional rates of economic growth” (Bordo and Rousseau, 2006).  
Beck and Levine (2002) empirically examine the two channels through which 
legal origin impacts finance. The “political” channel stresses that legal traditions vary in 
terms of the priority right that different nations assign to private property. In contrast, the 
“adaptability” channel emphasizes that legal traditions vary in the nation’s ability to 
adapt to changing conditions. The empirical results from both historical comparisons and 
cross-section regression support the “adaptability” channel.  
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Based on previous studies, this article examines the joint effect of legal and 
political factors on financial development and financial integration, respectively. An 
economy’s financial development and financial integration are different but related in 
that the deep fundamental conditions of a nation, such as legal origin and political factors, 
have an effect on both financial development and financial integration. However, as 
argued in the literature, they may have different effects on growth.   
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 describe the data 
and the method used to analyze the data. Section 4 examines the effect of financial 
integration on the link between financial development and growth. Section 5 explores the 
joint effects of legal origin and political factors on financial development and financial 
integration, respectively. The conclusion and summary are provided in Section 6.  
 
Data 
To study the relationship among economic growth, financial integration and 
financial development, I use per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) to measure 
economic performance. In this chapter the stock of liquid liabilities (M3) divided by GDP, 
which reflects the size of the economy’s banking system, is used as the measure of 
financial development. Because M3 is the most common measure of financial 
development, it allows me to focus primarily on the effect of financial integration on the 
link between financial development and growth. Both real GDP per capita and M3 are 
continuously available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator for all 50 
countries in the sample for the period 1960-1997.  
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  The complicated issue in financial integration literature is, of course, measuring 
the extent of integration. Among a wide array of possibilities, two major proxies are used: 
1) government restrictions on capital flows and 2) measures of actual international capital 
flows.  The IMF’s measure of restrictions on openness provides an indicator of 
governmental restrictions on international financial transactions that is a zero-one dummy. 
Another is Dennis Quinn’s measure, which is an improvement on the IMF’s measure. By 
reading through formal capital account restrictions, he assigns scores to each country.  
Quinn’s measure is available, however, only for selected years and countries. Although 
the IMF’s measure and Quinn’s are direct proxies for governmental impediments, they do 
not measure the magnitude of financial integration. On the other hand, actual capital 
flows are good measures of financial integration since they capture the extent of an 
individual country’s connection to the international financial markets. Another advantage 
of capital flows is that they are incremental variables and fluctuate over time. For many 
empirical studies, including mine, actual capital flows are more suitable measures. For 
instance, some African countries have very few restrictions on capital account openness 
and would be considered as open economy according to the IMF’s measure, yet actual 
capital flows into those countries are small. Another example is China, where there are 
extensive restrictions on cross-country capital flows, but actual flows are quite large. This 
paper therefore uses actual international capital flows as proxies for financial integration.  
The five measures used in this paper are: 1) the total flows of capital, which 
accumulate inflows and outflows for both FDI and portfolio investments; 2) the total 
inflows of capital, which are the sum of FDI and portfolio inflows; and 3) the total 
outflows of capital, which comprise FDI and portfolio outflows; 4) the total FDI, which 
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are the sum of FDI inflows and FDI outflows (i.e., FDI received by domestic countries 
and domestic countries’ direct investment in foreign countries); 5) the total portfolio 
investments, which reflect the sum of portfolio debt investment and portfolio equity 
investment (i.e., foreign countries’ portfolio investment in domestic countries and 
domestic countries’ portfolio investment in foreign countries). I obtained the data for FDI 
and portfolio investment flows from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
measured in current U.S. dollars. To remove the effect of inflation, all measures are 
reported as a percentage of GDP per capita.  The control variables I include in the 
subsequent regressions, such as the inflation rate, the log of secondary school enrollment 
rate and the log of initial level of real GDP per capita, are all taken from World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.  
The countries’ legal origins are taken from Levine-Loayza-Beck Dataset, Finance 
and the Sources of Growth and Financial Intermediation and Growth (2000). The 
countries with an English common law tradition are Australia, Canada, Ghana, India, 
Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States and Zimbabwe. Countries 
with a French civil law tradition are Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Senegal, Spain, Turkey, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. The countries with a German civil law origin are Austria, Germany, Japan, 
Korea and Switzerland. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have a Scandinavian 
legal origin.  
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  Political instability reflects the uncertainty of the future investment return, which 
can decrease or slow down the investment, thus affecting financial depth and reducing 
capital flow. The variables reflecting the political environment are from the dataset 
compiled by Leblang (2003, 2004). Because of the availability of this dataset, I limit my 
analysis to the period 1960-1997 for 50 countries. Leblang’s database provides several 
different indicators of the political environment, such as: whether a country has a 
parliamentary system or a presidential system (A key difference between parliamentary 
and presidential systems lies in the separation of the powers between the executive and 
the legislative branches); whether a country employs a party-proportional representation 
voting-system; whether there is a single political party that legally holds effective power; 
whether there is universal female suffrage, i.e., whether women have the right to vote and 
to run for office; the number of elections in every year; and the number of revolutions or 
coups. Although all the indicators are not direct proxies for the political environment 
except the number of elections and the number of revolutions or coups, they are all 
related to finance and growth. Since this paper aims at examining the relationship among 
financial development, financial integration and growth, I include all of them in my 
analysis.  
   Five-year averages of the variables are used in the regressions. There are some 
advantages in using panel data and five-year averages. The averages can characterize the 
steady state relationship between growth and other explanatory variables. Panel data 
contains multiple observations for multiple periods, a situation that allows us to take 
advantage of both cross-sectional regression and time-series regression. With panel data, 
it is possible to control for some types of omitted variables, such as those that differ 
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between cases but are constant over time and those that vary over time but are constant 
between cases. 
 
Methodology 
 Before applying the rolling window technique to examine the effect of financial 
integration on the finance-growth nexus, I use a series of OLS baseline regressions to 
investigate the relationship among growth, financial development and financial 
integration. The baseline growth regressions take the form:  
,y ,,,t,i tititi XF                                                                                    (1)  
where the dependent variable ti,y  is the five-year average of the annual growth rate of 
real per capita GDP. ti,F  is the five-year average of either liquid liabilities as a percentage 
of real GDP per capita or one measure of financial integration. ti,X
 
represents a vector of 
control variables that are associated with economic growth. I include both the log of real 
per capita GDP and the log of secondary school enrollment rate at the beginning of each 
five-year period as the control variables in basic growth regressions. ti, is a random 
disturbance that approximates the normal distribution. Dummy variables for each five-
year period are included in the regressions but not reported. The baseline financial 
development regressions take the following form: 
,FD ,,,t,i tititi XFI  
                                                                            
(2) 
where the dependent variable ti,FD  is the five-year average of liquid liabilities as a 
percentage of real GDP per capita. ti,FI  is the five-year average of one measure of 
financial integration. Again ti,X
 
represents a vector of control variables, which is the log 
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of real per capita GDP and the inflation rate at the beginning of each five-year period in 
financial development regressions.  
I then use the rolling window technique to examine the effect of financial 
integration on the link between financial development and economic growth. The rolling 
window method can capture the possible nonlinearities in the financial development 
coefficient in the growth regression. Thus, it generalizes the threshold method in previous 
studies by providing the entire evolutionary process of the coefficients. In this paper, all 
the observations are sorted according to the degree of financial integration. In each 
growth regression, liquid liabilities as a percentage of real GDP per capita and control 
variables, such as the log of initial real per capita GDP and the inflate rate, are included 
as independent variables. I start with 80 observations and then add one observation at a 
time until the full sample is included.  
To investigate how “deeper” fundamentals, such as a nation’s legal origin, the 
quality of the law enforcement and political environment affect finance, I first 
respectively examine whether the legal origin and political environment are correlated to 
financial development. With these results I then examine the joint effect of legal origin 
and political environment on financial development. The multiple regressions that 
combine the effect of legal origin with political variables take the following form:  
             
.FD ,,,t,i tititii XPL                                                                    
(3) 
Again the dependent variable ti,FD  is the five-year average of liquid liabilities. 
iL  is the legal origin for country i and ti,P represents a set of variables that reflect the 
political environment for country i at period t.  ti,X
 
is a vector of control variables, such 
as the log of real per capita GDP and the inflation rate at the beginning of each five-year 
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period. Similar multiple regressions are applied for different measures of financial 
integration:  
            
.FI ,,,t,i tititii XPL                                                                     
(4) 
After separately comparing the effect of legal origin and political environment on 
financial development and financial integration, I further investigate the role of the legal 
and political environment on the relationship between financial development and 
financial integration. Consider the following regression equation:  
           
,FI ,,,t,i tititi XFD                                                                            
(5) 
where control variable ti,X
 
represents the log of real per capita GDP at the beginning of 
each five-year period. Two instrumental regressions are applied for comparison with the 
OLS regression. First, the contemporary five-year averages of liquid liabilities are 
instrumented with the initial values of the liquid liabilities for each five-year period. 
Secondly, the contemporary five-year averages of liquid liabilities are instrumented with 
legal origin and political variables. The dummy variables for each five-year period are 
included in the regression, but not reported. Comparison of the results from the two 
instrumental regressions implies the channel through which legal and political factors 
affect finance.  
 
Financial Development, Financial Integration and Growth 
The regression analysis includes standard explanatory variables such as the log of 
initial real GDP per capita, the log of initial secondary school enrollment and the inflation 
rate. Dummy variables for each five-year period are also included in the regressions, but 
not reported in the table. All the explanatory variables and the dependent variables are 
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five-year averages. I use the initial levels of the explanatory variables in order to reduce 
the simultaneous bias.  
Table 8 reports the results of the base-line OLS growth regression. Each column 
reports the results from regressions including either M3 or one measure of financial 
integration, and other control variables. All initial values are measured at the start of each 
five-year period. The logs of the initial level of real GDP per capita have negative 
coefficients due to convergence. In the regression using broad money as an explanatory 
variable, the negative coefficient of the initial level of GDP is statistically insignificant. 
However coefficients of the initial level of GDP are statistically significant in all the 
other regressions in which measures of financial integration are respectively used as 
explanatory variables. The log of the initial level of secondary school enrollment rate for 
each five-year average, which reflects the nations’ development of human capital, has a 
positive coefficient. The coefficients of all regressions with the financial integration 
measures are significant. The broad money supply M3 as the percentage of GDP has a 
positive statistically significant coefficient, which is consistent with the previous studies 
of the relationship between financial development and economic growth. On the other 
hand, all the measurements of financial integration have a statistically insignificant 
coefficient, which means there is no evidence that financial integration has an important 
influence on growth.  
Table 9 reports the results of the OLS regression of financial development on 
financial integration. The inflation rate, measured as the average annual growth rate of 
the consumer price index (CPI) in each five-year period, has a negative effect on the 
broad money supply. In other words, a higher inflation rate can help reduce the broad  
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Table 8.  OLS Growth Regression on Either Financial Development or Financial 
Integration, 50 Countries for 1960-1997 
  
M3 (% of 
GDP) 
Total 
flow      
Total 
inflow 
Total 
outflow 
Total FDI Total 
Portfolio 
       Log of initial real  -0.238 -0.384** -0.380** -0.333** -0.372** -0.390** 
per capita GDP (0.173) (0.174) (0.167) (0.175) (0.165) (0.169) 
       
Log of initial  0.334 1.291** 1.248** 1.288** 1.316** 1.327** 
school enrollment 
(%) 
(0.416) (0.428) (0.426) (0.427) (0.424) (0.426) 
 
      
Initial level of M3 0.011*      
(% of GDP) (0.006)      
 
      
Initial level of  0.018 0.076 -0.061 -0.033 0.006 
financial integration  
(% of GDP) 
(0.058) (0.089) (0.092) (0.090) (0.046) 
 
      
R square 0.098 0.108 0.107 0.109 0.112 0.109 
No. Observations 247 243 247 243 245 244 
              
Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regression with standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variables are the five-year averages of annual growth rate of 
real per capita GDP. The log of real per capita GDP and log of secondary school 
enrollment rate at the start of each five-year period are included in the regression as 
control variables. Either measure of financial development or one measure of financial 
integration is included as explanatory variable in the regression. The measure of financial 
development and measures of financial integration are a percentage of real GDP per 
capita and are five-year averages from 1960 to 1997. Dummy variables for each five-year 
period are included in the regression but not reported. * and ** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.   
 
 
money supply.  This situation occurs because a higher inflation rate can lead to 
difficulties in nominal contracting and then dampen financial development. All the 
measures of financial integration have positive coefficients, and four of them are 
statistically significant except the coefficient on total portfolio investment. These results 
mean that financial integration is related to financial development. 
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Table 9.  OLS Regression of Financial Development on Financial Integration, 50 
Countries for 1960-1997 
  Total 
flow 
Total 
inflow 
Total 
outflow 
Total FDI Total 
Portfolio 
      Log of initial real  9.743** 10.731** 9.777** 10.863** 11.589** 
per capita GDP (1.336) (1.279) (1.331) (1.255) (1.297) 
 
     
Initial level of -0.080** -0.089** -0.081** -0.088** -0.095** 
inflation rate (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
 
     
Initial level of  2.016** 2.1098** 3.816** 1.963** 0.737 
financial integration 
(% of GDP) 
(0.535) (0.822) (1.011) (0.728) (0.577) 
 
     
R square 0.380 0.356 0.380 0.356 0.347 
No. Observations 228 232 228 230 229 
            
Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regression with standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variables are the five-year averages of liquid liabilities as 
percentage real per capita GDP. The logs of real per capita GDP, inflation rate and one 
measurement of financial integration as a percentage of real GDP per capita are included 
on the right hand of the regression. All the three independent variables are measured at 
the start of each five-year period from 1960 through 1997. Dummy variables for each 
five-year period are included in the regression but not reported. * and ** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.   
 
When the findings in table 8 and table 9 are combined, financial integration itself 
is shown not to have a significant effect on growth, despite being correlated to financial 
development. These results lead to the following question: How does financial integration 
affect the link between financial development and growth?  
To assess this question, I apply the rolling window method to a dataset of 50 
countries from 1960 to 1997. All the observations are sorted according to financial 
integration. Five-year averages are used; thus there are 8 observations for each country 
and in total 400 observations at most for each variable. Eighty observations are applied at 
the beginning and then one observation at a time is added until the full sample is included. 
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Since there are five different measurements of financial integration, I sorted all the 
observations according to these and respectively applied the rolling window OLS 
regression to each. For instance, all observations are ordered from the lowest to the 
highest total capital flows share. The first regression uses the data from first 10 countries 
(80 observations at most) of the ordered data set; the second regression uses a similar 
data range by moving the 80 window toward higher total capital flows share by one 
observation, and so on.  The selection of the constant window is very significant since it 
can affect the cross-window comparison of the estimated coefficients. The window size 
of 80 in this paper provides a fair distribution of across the power of regressions. The 
results are robust to the selection of the window size as the results under different 
selections of window size are similar to the results here.  
Figure 5 shows the results when total capital flows, as percentage of GDP, are 
used as the measurement of financial integration. The X-axis shows the average level of 
total capital flows share across the 80 observations, while the Y-axis shows the estimated 
coefficient of financial development on economic growth in each regression. The solid 
line gives the coefficients and the dotted line shows the standard error interval
4
.  I find 
that for the countries with a very low percentage of total capital flows (total capital flow 
share below a 2 percent of GDP), the coefficients of financial development are positive 
most of the time, but not statistically significant. However, in the middle range of total 
capital flow shares, the coefficients become positive and statistically significant, which is 
evidence of the finance growth nexus. This relationship disappears among very high total 
capital flow share countries, since it is obvious that the coefficients are insignificant and 
even negative when total capital flow share above 5 percent of GDP. Financial  
                                                          
4
 The estimations results are showed in the appendix.  
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Fig. 5.  Evolution of Financial Development Coefficients in a Rolling 10-Country 
Window Ordered by Increased Total Flows (%GDP), 1960-1997 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Evolution of Financial Development Coefficients in a Rolling 10-Country 
Window Ordered by Increased Total Inflows (%GDP), 1960-199 
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Fig. 7.  Evolution of Financial Development Coefficients in a Rolling 10-Country 
Window Ordered by Increased Total Outflows (%GDP), 1960-1997 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Evolution of Financial Development Coefficients in a Rolling 10-Country 
Window Ordered by Increased Total FDI (%GDP), 1960-1997 
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Fig. 9.  Evolution of Financial Development Coefficients in a Rolling 10-Country 
Window Ordered by Increased Total Portfolio Investment (%GDP), 1960-1997 
 
development promotes economic growth when there is a moderate amount of capital 
flows. Once there are excessive of capital flows, the benefit of finance development on 
growth disappears. Figure 6 to 9 show the rolling window regression results when total 
capital inflows, total capital outflows, total FDI and total portfolio investment are used as 
measures of financial integration. Similar results are obtained: Only a moderate amount 
of financial integration benefit the link between financial development and economic 
growth. The effect of financial integration on the finance-growth nexus requires further 
analysis of financial development and financial integration, which is presented in the next 
section.  
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Deep Fundamentals, Financial Development and Financial Integration 
In this section, I explore the importance of deep fundamentals in fostering 
financial development and financial integration. The deep fundamentals considered in 
this paper are the legal origins and the political environment as mentioned in the previous 
section.  
I use a baseline regression framework to assess whether legal origin and political 
variables are correlated to financial development, respectively. Financial depth, measured 
as ratio of broad money (M3) to GDP, is used as the dependent variable in all these OLS 
regressions. First, I examine the relationship between financial depth and the particular 
type of legal origin, with the results reported in table 10.  The initial level of per capita 
real GDP, the initial level of inflation rate and dummy variables for each time period are 
included as basic explanatory variables. The first column reports the results for the basic 
regression. The second column reports results from the regression that includes basic 
explanatory variables along with civil legal origin as a dummy variable in the regression. 
The third column uses three legal origin dummies instead of civil legal origin in the 
regression.  The initial values of real per capita GDP and the inflation rate are taken from 
the first year of each period. Dummy variables for each five-year period are not reported 
in the table.  As in the results of La Porta et al. (1997), I find that the countries with a 
civil law origin have a lower level of financial development than those with an English 
common law origin. When three legal origin dummies, i.e., French, German, and 
Scandinavian legal origin, are included in the regression, the findings are different from 
the results in La Porta, yet consistent with the findings of Bordo and Rousseau (2006). 
Countries with a German legal origin outperform English, French and Scandinavian  
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Table 10.  OLS Regressions of Financial Development on Legal Origins, 50 Countries 
for 1960-1997 
Dependent variable:  M3 (% of GDP) M3 (% of GDP) M3 (% of GDP) 
    
Log of initial real per capita GDP 11.240** 12.031** 10.505** 
 (0.922) (0.926) (0.906) 
    
Initial inflation rate -0.094** -0.081** -0.065** 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.022) 
    
Civil origin  -10.677**  
  (2.775)  
    
French legal origin  -14.909** 
   (2.563) 
    
German legal origin  26.160** 
   (4.447) 
    
Scandinavian legal origin -22.590** 
   (4.453) 
    
R square 0.392 0.419 0.569 
No. Observations 326 326 326 
Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in 
parentheses. The first column reports the results from basic regression including only 
control variables: the log of real per capita GDP and inflation rate at the start of each 
five-year period as independent variables. The second column reports results from the 
regression including control variables and civil legal origin as a dummy variable, while 
the third column reports the results from regression including control variables and three 
types of legal origin as dummies.  The dependent variable is averaged over every five 
years for the period 1960-1997. Dummy variables for each five-year period are included 
in the regression but not reported. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 
percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.   
 
systems with our bank-based measure of financial depth. Further, countries with French 
and Scandinavian systems have less financial development than countries with the 
English legal system, as in La Porta et al. (1997). 
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Table 11 reports the relation between financial development and the political 
variables listed in the left-hand column. Financial development measured as the 
percentage of GDP is the dependent variable for all the regressions. In addition to 
constant, dummy variables for time and the single political variable, the right-hand side 
of each regression in second column includes the log of real per capita GDP at the start of 
each five-year period; the last column adds the inflation rate at the start of each five-year 
period into the control set. Among all the political variables listed in the left-hand column, 
the parliamentary or mixed system is correlated to a higher level of financial system, 
while the electoral systems based on proportional representation have a negative effect on 
financial development. Frequent elections (both contemporary and lag of number of 
elections) are positively related to financial depth. The number of coups (both 
contemporary and the lag of the number of coups) has a negative but statistically 
insignificant coefficient. Dummy variables indicating whether the government is under a 
single party majority and whether there is universal female suffrage have statistically 
insignificant coefficients, a situation which suggests that they do not have an important 
effect on financial development. 
Based on the results in table 10 and table 11, table 12 reports the findings from a 
set of multiple regressions that combine legal origin with political variables. Once again, 
the dependent variable is financial development. Four political variables, a dummy 
variable indicating whether the government is based on a parliamentary or a mixed 
system, the number of elections, the number of coups and a dummy variable representing 
whether the government is under a single party majority, are used in the regressions. The 
selection of the political variables is based on the results in table 11 and previous studies   
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Table 11.  OLS Regressions of Financial Development on Individual Political Variables 
Respectively, 50 Countries for 1960-1997 
Dependent variable:  M3 (% of GDP) M3 (% of GDP) 
 
 
 Parliamentary or mixed system 19.532** 17.538** 
 
(3.050) (3.191) 
 
  
Proportional representation electoral system -10.474** -12.881** 
 
(3.487) (3.517) 
 
  
No. of elections 23.626** 22.887** 
 
(8.271) (8.259) 
 
  
No. of coups -25.961 -23.133 
 
(25.672) (25.846) 
 
  
Lag of elections 19.057* 18.748* 
 
(10.066) (10.089) 
 
  
Lag of coups -33.691 -28.582 
 
(27.214) (27.430) 
 
  
Single party majority 3.499 4.494 
 
(3.268) (3.299) 
 
  
Universal female suffrage -10.906 -9.338 
 
(7.103) (7.050) 
      
Note: The table reports coefficients and standard errors for the political variables from 
separate OLS regressions. Dependent variables are liquid liabilities as a percentage of 
real GDP per capita, and are averaged over every five years for the period 1960-1997. In 
addition to a constant, dummy variables for each time period and the single political 
variable are used as control variables. Regressions in second column also include the log 
of real per capita GDP at the start of each five-year period; regressions in the last column 
include both the log of real GDP per capita and inflation rate at the start of each five-year 
period. Dummy variables for each five-year period are included in the regression but not 
reported. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, 
respectively.   
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(Bordo and Rousseau, 2006). The findings obtained here are robust to the results in table 
10 and table 11. If civil law origin is included, countries with a civil law origin have a 
lower level of financial development than those with an English common law origin. 
When three legal origin dummies, i.e., French, German and Scandinavian legal origin, are 
included in the regression, countries with a German legal origin outperform English, 
French and Scandinavian systems with our bank-based measure of financial depth. 
Further, countries with French and Scandinavian systems have less financial development 
than countries with an English legal system. The parliamentary or mixed system and 
frequent elections are correlated to a higher level of financial system (the contemporary 
number of elections and number of coups are used in the regression; the results are robust 
when the lag of elections and the lag of coups are used).  
The comparison of the sample of countries in this paper with those in Bordo and 
Rousseau (2006) reveals why I find countries with a French legal origin do not 
outperform financially. Bordo and Rousseau include only two Latin American countries 
with a French legal system: Argentina and Brazil. However, in this paper the Latin 
American countries with a French legal system are: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.  Most of these countries today have low financial development as well as a 
low income level. Secondly, Bordo and Rousseau (2006) point out that country with a 
Scandinavian legal system experienced a reversal from being the most financially 
developed in 1880-1929 to the least developed in 1945-1990, which is consistent with the 
conclusion in this article that Scandinavian countries are least financially developed.  
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Table 12.  OLS Regressions of Financial Development on Both Legal Origins and 
Political Variables, 50 Countries for 1960-1997 
Dependent variable:  M3 (% of GDP) M3 (% of GDP) 
   Log of initial real  9.877** 9.513** 
per capita GDP (1.193) (1.094) 
 
 
 
Civil origin -5.544*  
 
(3.178)  
 
  
French legal origin -9.242** 
  (3.227) 
   
German legal origin 22.763** 
  (4.639) 
   
Scandinavian legal origin -25.195** 
 
 (4.794) 
 
  
Parliamentary or  17.128** 14.877** 
mixed system (3.232) (3.208) 
 
  
No. of elections 19.322** 7.513 
 
(7.794) (7.000) 
 
  
No. of coups -12.572 -11.856 
 
(23.896) (21.063) 
 
  
Single party majority 3.031 -0.421 
 
(3.055) (2.739) 
 
  
R square 0.442 0.569 
No. Observations 291 291 
      
Note: The table reports coefficients and standard errors for OLS regressions. Dependent 
variables are liquid liabilities as a percentage of real GDP per capita, and are averaged 
over every five years for the period 1960-1997. Initial values of per capita GDP are 
measured at the start of each five-year period. Dummy variables for each five-year period 
are included in the regression but not reported. * and ** denote statistical significance at 
the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.   
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Table 13.  OLS Regressions of Financial Integration on Legal Origins, 50 Countries for 
1960-1997, One Legal Origin Dummy 
Dependent 
variable:  
Total 
flow 
Total 
inflow 
Total 
outflow 
Total 
FDI 
Total 
Portfolio 
      Log of initial real  1.789** 0.752** 0.996** 0.567** 1.205** 
per capita GDP (0.235) (0.118) (0.137) (0.105) (0.179) 
 
     
Civil origin -2.148** -1.442** -0.803** -1.210** -0.961* 
 
(0.668) (0.337) (0.389) (0.299) (0.510) 
 
     
R square 0.374 0.358 0.317 0.305 0.287 
No. Observations 269 271 269 269 270 
            
Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is one measure of financial integration as a 
percentage of real GDP per capita and is averaged over every five years for the period 
1960-1997. The initial values of real per capita GDP are taken from the first year of each 
period. Dummy variables for each five-year period are included in the regression but not 
reported. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
Table 13 reports the regression results for all 50 countries with only one legal 
origin dummy.  The dependent variables involve financial integration as a percentage of 
real GDP per capita and are averaged over every five years for the period 1960-1997. The 
initial values of real per capita GDP and dummy variables for each five-year period are 
included in the regression. For comparison, table 14 reports the regression results for all 
50 countries with three legal origin dummies.  The dependent variables and other 
explanatory variables are the same as in table 13. I find that countries with a civil law 
origin have a lower level of financial integration than those with an English common law 
origin for all the five measurements. Moreover, countries with French and German 
systems have less financial integration than English common law system countries for 
almost all the measures.  On the other hand, countries with a Scandinavian system do not  
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Table 14.  OLS Regressions of Financial Integration on Legal Origins, 50 Countries for 
1960-1997, Three Legal Origin Dummies 
Dependent 
variable:  
Total 
flow 
Total 
inflow 
Total 
outflow 
Total 
FDI 
Total 
Portfolio 
      Log of initial real  1.814** 0.820** 0.944** 0.617** 1.162** 
per capita GDP (0.261) (0.131) (0.152) (0.115) (0.199) 
 
     
French legal origin -2.079** -1.279** -0.918** -1.072** -1.066* 
 (0.709) (0.355) (0.413) (0.314) (0.542) 
      
German legal 
origin 
-2.655** -2.378** -0.320 -2.235** -0.316 
 (1.194) (0.601) (0.695) (0.529) (0.902) 
      
Scandinavian legal  -1.965 -1.402** -0.582 -0.831 -1.074 
origin (1.342) (0.675) (0.781) (0.594) (1.025) 
 
     
R square 0.375 0.367 0.319 0.321 0.289 
No. Observations 269 271 269 269 270 
            
Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is one measure of financial integration as a 
percentage of real GDP per capita and is averaged over every five years for the period 
1960-1997. The initial values of real per capita GDP are taken from the first year of each 
period. Dummy variables for each five-year period are included in the regression but not 
reported. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, 
respectively.   
 
have less financial integration for almost all the measures. The French legal system, the 
most rigidly codified and providing the least protection of property rights, underperforms 
both the German and the Scandinavian systems for all the measures except total capital 
inflows.  
As in table 11, table 15 reports the relation between financial integration and the 
individual political variables listed in the left-hand side column. The measures of 
financial integration are the dependent variable for all the regressions. In addition to a  
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Table 15.  OLS Regressions of Financial Integration on Individual Political Variables, 50 
Countries for 1960-1997 
Dependent variable:  Total 
flow 
Total 
inflow 
Total 
outflow 
Total  Total 
Portfolio 
 
FDI p
 
     
Parliamentary or  1.730** 0.769** 1.116** 0.923** 0.887 
mixed system (0.732) (0.375) (0.420) (0.329) (0.555) 
 
     
Proportional 
representation  
-1.238 -1.149** -0.179 -1.481** 0.226 
electoral system (0.769) (0.383) (0.448) (0.331) (0.587) 
 
     
No. of elections -1.518 -1.064 -0.212 -1.572* 0.495 
 
(2.051) (1.049) (1.182) (0.921) (1.504) 
 
     
No. of coups 4.901 0.040 4.456 -0.469 4.816 
 
(8.643) (4.435) (4.972) (3.901) (6.518) 
 
     
Lag of elections -1.977 -1.206 -0.268 -1.177 0.068 
 
(2.178) (1.087) (1.264) (0.967) (1.601) 
 
     
Lag of coups 2.205 -0.147 2.171 -0.681 2.599 
 
(5.632) (2.847) (3.261) (2.505) (4.270) 
 
     
Single party majority 0.196 0.234 -0.080 0.498 -0.454 
 
(0.706) (0.361) (0.407) (0.317) (0.532) 
 
     
Universal female 
suffrage 
1.285 1.080 0.157 1.020 0.277 
 
(1.678) (0.859) (0.967) (0.755) (1.268) 
           
Note: The table reports coefficients and standard errors for the political variables from 
separate OLS regressions. The dependent variable is one measure of financial integration 
as a percentage of real GDP per capita and is averaged over every five years for the 
period 1960-1997. In addition to a constant, dummy variables for each time period, the 
log of real GDP per capita at the start of each five-year period, and the single political 
variable are used as explanatory variables. Dummy variables for each five-year period are 
included in the regression but not reported. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 
10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.   
 
 
 
constant, dummy variables for time and the single political variable, the right-hand side 
of each regression includes the log of real per capita GDP at the start of each five-year 
period.  Among all the political variables listed in the left-hand column, the parliamentary 
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or mixed system is correlated to higher level of financial integration for most of measures, 
while the electoral systems based on proportional representation have a negative effect on 
total capital inflows and total FDI. Frequent elections (contemporary number of elections) 
are negatively related to total FDI. All the other political variables have statistically 
insignificant coefficients on financial integration. 
Table 16 and table 17 report the findings from a set of multiple regressions that 
combine legal origin with political variables. The dependent variable is, once again, a 
measure of financial integration. Four political variables, whether the government is 
based on a parliamentary or a mixed system, the number of elections, the number of 
coups and whether the government is under a single party majority, are used in the 
regressions. Although the last two political variables are not significant in the previous 
regression, I keep them in the regression as they were important in earlier studies (Bordo 
and Rousseau, 2006).  Table 16 includes civil legal origin as a dummy variable in the 
regression, while table 17 uses three legal origin dummies instead of civil legal origin in 
the regression. The findings are robust to the results in tables 13, 14 and 15. If civil law 
origin is included, countries with a civil law origin have a lower level of financial 
integration than those with an English common law origin. When three legal origin 
dummies, i.e., French, German and Scandinavian legal origin, are included in the 
regression, countries with French and German systems have less financial integration 
than English common law system countries for almost all the measurements. On the other 
hand, countries with Scandinavian systems do not have less financial integration for 
almost all the measures. The parliamentary or mixed system is correlated to higher level 
of financial integration only for some measures (the contemporary number of elections 
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Table 16.  OLS Multiple Regressions of Financial Integration on Both Legal Origins and 
Political Variables, 50 Countries for 1960-1997 
Dependent 
variable:  
Total 
flow 
Total 
inflow 
Total 
outflow 
Total 
FDI 
Total 
Portfolio 
      Log of initial real  1.695** 0.745** 0.874** 0.559** 1.076** 
per capita GDP (0.282) (0.143) (0.164) (0.125) (0.216) 
 
     
Civil origin -1.880** -1.389** -0.553 -1.039** -0.857 
 
(0.735) (0.372) (0.426) (0.325) (0.562) 
 
     
Parliamentary or  1.114 0.293 0.947** 0.572* 0.616 
mixed system (0.776) (0.392) (0.450) (0.343) (0.594) 
 
     
No. of elections -2.134 -1.390 -0.539 -1.904** 0.210 
 
(2.024) (1.023) (1.174) (0.894) (1.503) 
 
     
No. of coups 4.403 -0.415 4.385 -0.944 4.864 
 
(8.505) (4.308) (4.931) (3.758) (6.503) 
 
     
Single party  -0.181 0.004 -0.249 0.310 -0.650 
majority (0.703) (0.355) (0.407) (0.310) (0.537) 
 
     
R square 0.380 0.361 0.330 0.326 0.293 
No. Observations 263 265 263 263 264 
            
Note: The table reports coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions. The 
dependent variable is one measure of financial integration as a percentage of real GDP 
per capita and is averaged over every five years for the period 1960-1997. Initial values 
of per capita GDP are measured at the start of each five-year period. Dummy variables 
for each five-year period are included in the regression but not reported. * and ** denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.   
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Table 17. OLS Multiple Regressions of Financial Integration on Both Legal Origins and 
Political Variables, 50 Countries for 1960-1997 
Dependent variable:  Total 
flow 
Total 
inflow 
Total 
outflow 
Total 
FDI 
Total 
Portfolio 
 
flo  inflo  outflo  I portfolio 
      Log of initial real  1.743** 0.796** 0.872** 0.600** 1.079** 
per capita GDP (0.291) (0.146) (0.169) (0.127) (0.223) 
 
     
French legal origin -1.640** -1.131** -0.576 -0.811** -0.871 
 (0.805) (0.405) (0.467) (0.351) (0.616) 
      
German legal origin -2.618** -2.364** -0.313 -2.145** -0.409 
 (1.240) (0.624) (0.719) (0.541) (0.940) 
      
Scandinavian legal 
origin 
-2.185 -1.463** -0.772 -0.739 -1.455 
 
(1.408) (0.709) (0.817) (0.614) (1.077) 
 
     
Parliamentary or  1.310 0.496 0.937** 0.736** 0.630 
mixed system (0.827) (0.416) (0.480) (0.361) (0.633) 
 
     
No. of elections -2.023 -1.237 -0.581 -1.723* 0.086 
 
(2.036) (1.023) (1.182) (0.889) (1.517) 
 
     
No. of coups 4.539 -0.294 4.399 -0.878 4.946 
 
(8.532) (4.295) (4.951) (3.724) (6.522) 
 
     
Single party majority -0.233 -0.021 -0.274 0.331 -0.718 
 
(0.722) (0.362) (0.419) (0.315) (0.551) 
 
     
R square 0.382 0.370 0.331 0.344 0.295 
No. Observations 263 265 263 263 264 
            
Note: The table reports coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions. The 
dependent variable is one measure of financial integration as a percentage of real GDP 
per capita and is averaged over every five years for the period 1960-1997. Initial values 
of per capita GDP are measured at the start of each five-year period. Dummy variables 
for each five-year period are included in the regression but not reported. * and ** denote 
statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.   
 
and number of coups are used in the regression; the results are robust when the lag of 
elections and the lag of coups are used). 
In table 9, I show that financial integration has a positive effect on financial 
development for all the measures except total portfolio investment. However, I find the 
reverse effect in results reported in table 18.  In addition to financial development, initial  
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Table 18. OLS Regressions of Financial Integration on Financial Development, 50 
Countries for 1960-1997 
Dependent 
variable:  
Total 
flow 
Total 
inflow 
Total 
outflow 
Total 
FDI 
Total 
Portfolio 
      Log of initial real  1.237** 0.580** 0.606** 0.305** 0.913** 
per capita GDP (0.291) (0.154) (0.161) (0.130) (0.224) 
 
     
Initial level  0.026* 0.005 0.021** 0.014** 0.013 
of M3 (% of GDP) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) 
 
     
R square 0.312 0.274 0.283 0.262 0.226 
No. Observations 238 240 238 238 239 
            
Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regression with standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is one measure of financial integration as a 
percentage of real GDP per capita and is averaged over every five years for the period 
1960-1997. Initial values of per capita GDP and liquid liabilities are measured at the start 
of each five-year period. Dummy variables for each five-year period are included in the 
regression but not reported. * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 
5 percent levels, respectively.   
 
values of per capita GDP and dummy variables for each five-year period are used as 
explanatory variables. Financial development has a positive effect on three of the five 
measures of financial integrations.  
Table 19 shows the results of instrumental regressions of financial integration on 
financial development. Financial development is instrumented with the initial values of 
the financial development for each five-year period as an instrument variable in the upper 
panel, while the lower panel uses legal origin and political variables as instrument 
variables (as listed in the first column in table 16). Civil law origin is used instead of 
three legal origins in order to avoid over identification. The dummy variables for each 
five-year period are included in the regression, but not reported. The coefficients of  
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Table 19. Instrumental Regressions of Financial Integration on Financial Development, 
50 Countries for 1960-1997 
Dependent 
variable:  
Total 
flow 
Total 
inflow 
Total 
outflow 
Total 
FDI 
Total 
Portfolio 
      Log of initial real  1.248** 0.583** 0.615** 0.311** 0.919** 
per capita GDP (0.287) (0.152) (0.159) (0.129) (0.221) 
 
     
M3 (% of GDP) 0.024* 0.005 0.020** 0.013** 0.012 
 
(0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) 
 
     
R square 0.316 0.276 0.284 0.263 0.229 
No. Observations 238 240 238 238 239 
                  
Log of initial real  0.546 0.092 0.318 -0.068 0.550 
per capita GDP (0.476) (0.257) (0.261) (0.218) (0.358) 
 
     
M3 (% of GDP) 0.084** 0.046** 0.045** 0.045** 0.043* 
 
(0.034) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.025) 
 
     
R square 0.261 0.182 0.245 0.171 0.202 
No. Observations 234 236 234 234 235 
            
Note: The table reports coefficients from instrumental regressions with standard errors in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is one measure of financial integration as a 
percentage of real GDP per capita and is averaged over every five years for the period 
1960-1997. Initial values of per capita GDP are measured at the start of each five-year 
period. The upper panel reports the results from the regression using the initial values of 
the liquid liabilities for each five-year period as instrument variables. The lower panel 
reports the results from the regression using the legal origins and political factors as 
instrument variables. Civil law origin is used as a dummy instead of three types of legal 
origin dummy variables to avoid over identification. Dummy variables for each five-year 
period are included in the regression but not reported. * and ** denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.   
 
financial development are larger and more statistically significant when legal origin and 
political environment are used as instrument variables. Those results confirm previous 
findings that financial integration and financial development are correlated. Legal origin 
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and political environment affect both financial development and financial integration. 
Moreover, legal-political factors affect financial integration through the financial 
development channel. 
 
Summary of the Chapter 
Recent cross-country investigations of the finance-growth nexus show that 
financial development is an important determinant of long run economic growth. 
However, the effect of financial integration on growth is still ambiguous. This paper 
examines the effect of financial integration on the link between financial development 
and growth using the rolling window technique. I find that financial development 
promotes economic growth when there is a moderate amount of financial integration. 
Once there is excessive financial integration, the benefit of finance development on 
growth disappears. The effect of financial integration on finance-growth nexus leads to 
further studies on the relationship between financial development and financial 
integration.  
Another branch of the literature investigates the role of deep institutional 
fundamentals, such as legal-political factors, in the process of financial development. 
Countries with poorer protection of property rights have less developed financial markets. 
Using data for 50 countries from 1960 to 1997, I examine the joint effect of legal origin 
and political environment on financial development and financial integration, 
respectively. I find that financial development is related to financial integration and they 
are driven by the same deep institutional fundamentals. Further, legal-political factors 
affect financial integration through the financial development channel.  
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Appendix  
 
Table 20. Regression Results of GDP Growth on Financial Development in a Rolling 10-Country 
Window Ordered by Increasing Total Flows (%GDP), 1960-1997 
Coefficient Standard error T statistics No. observation Total flows 
0.079 0.030 2.575 52 0.988 
0.043 0.034 1.276 52 1.117 
-0.010 0.029 -0.365 53 1.230 
0.001 0.030 0.043 53 1.353 
-0.023 0.039 -0.584 53 1.462 
0.002 0.034 0.063 53 1.578 
0.016 0.035 0.456 53 1.669 
0.014 0.035 0.411 53 1.773 
0.009 0.034 0.256 53 1.875 
0.007 0.032 0.221 59 1.975 
0.007 0.023 0.297 59 2.063 
0.028 0.023 1.245 59 2.146 
0.042 0.022 1.860 59 2.269 
0.041 0.023 1.784 59 2.367 
0.044 0.016 2.860 58 2.493 
0.054 0.019 2.899 58 2.585 
0.053 0.019 2.817 58 2.675 
0.050 0.017 2.852 58 2.789 
0.022 0.010 2.286 58 2.913 
0.020 0.010 2.007 57 3.066 
0.021 0.009 2.402 57 3.204 
0.010 0.008 1.197 53 3.412 
0.009 0.010 0.966 54 3.610 
0.009 0.010 0.927 51 3.826 
0.009 0.010 0.916 52 4.054 
0.017 0.010 1.787 46 4.213 
0.016 0.010 1.626 40 4.369 
0.020 0.010 1.910 40 4.554 
0.030 0.021 1.421 40 4.769 
0.009 0.031 0.296 39 4.937 
0.015 0.017 0.888 39 5.092 
0.008 0.017 0.485 43 5.237 
-0.003 0.021 -0.159 43 5.392 
-0.015 0.021 -0.709 46 5.604 
-0.015 0.019 -0.815 46 5.837 
-0.015 0.019 -0.815 46 6.416 
-0.016 0.016 -0.995 50 7.109 
-0.012 0.009 -1.400 50 7.836 
-0.012 0.010 -1.185 50 9.027 
-0.012 0.010 -1.155 46 10.193 
Note: The table reports the coefficient, standard error, t statistics and number of observations for 
each regression in a rolling 10-country window. The last column reports the average level of total 
flows across 10 countries for each regression.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EQUITY MARKETS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
Introduction 
The rapid growth of equity markets in both emerging and developed markets in 
recent years has prompted both economists and policymakers to pay more attention to 
their impact on growth. It is widely accepted that financial development plays a 
potentially important role in long run growth. Many important theoretical and empirical 
studies have offered detailed argument and evidence for the role of finance in 
accelerating economic growth, such as those of Joseph Schumpeter (1912), Goldsmith 
(1969) and McKinnon (1973). Financial intermediaries, markets and institutions can 
provide the services to ameliorate transactions and information cost, facilitate risk 
management, mobilize savings and monitor managers, and thus can promote 
technological innovation and economic growth.  The literature offers a key insight for 
understanding the effect of finance on growth. In particular, it suggests two different 
channels through which finance affect growth. The first one is the “total factor 
productivity” channel, which emphasizes the role of efficient resource allocation. 
Innovative financial instruments can ameliorate informational asymmetries, help monitor 
the manager and ease risk management, and then accelerate growth. The second is the 
“factor accumulation” channel, which stresses the role of capital accumulation. Financial 
intermediaries encourage savings and investment, improve the allocations from savings 
to productive investment, and take full advantage of resources.  
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In the empirical literature, the econometric approaches used to examine the 
relationship between finance development and economic growth can be classified into 
three groups: pure cross-section analysis, panel data techniques that use information from 
both cross-section and time-series dimensions, and microeconomic studies that use 
industry-level data or firm-level data. King and Levine (1993) applied cross-section 
growth regression on data from 80 countries over the 1960-1989 periods and concluded 
that countries with better-developed financial institutions grow faster than those with 
less-developed financial institutions.  They also find evidence that the degree of financial 
development can predict future economic growth and the rate of capital accumulation. 
However, pure cross-section studies did not establish a causal relationship between 
finance development and long-run growth, and the results from cross-section studies may 
be undermined by simultaneity bias, omitted variables and unobserved country-specific 
effects.  
Time series analysis for individual countries (for example, Jung 1986) is an 
alternative econometric method being used to examine the causal relationship between 
finance and growth. Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) examine the effect of finance on 
growth in five industrialized countries with the VAR method and vector error correction 
model (VECM). Using historical data (1879-1929), they found support for the leading 
role of financial intermediaries in output growth.  Generalized method of moments 
(GMM) dynamic panel estimators, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano 
and Bover (1995), present a popular method used to deal with the bias induced by 
unobserved country-specific effects and the endogeneity of the explanatory variables 
when analyzing the link between finance and growth in recent literature. Levine, Loayza 
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and Beck (2000) applied both traditional cross-country growth regressions and the GMM 
dynamic panel techniques on 74 countries for the period from 1960 to 1995. They argued 
that the two methods provide consistent results: financial developments have positive 
effects on real sector growth.  
The financial system consists of banks, non-bank financial institutions (such as an 
insurance company) and stock markets. The stock market allows companies to issue and 
publicly trade shares at a given price, which is another important source, other than the 
bank system, from which companies can obtain external funds. The most important 
advantage of investing in the stock market is the liquidity: the investors and entrepreneurs 
have the ability to sell the securities quickly and easily. Financial services provided by 
stock markets are different from the services provided by banks. Well-developed stock 
markets can help allocate capital more efficiently, diversify risks, reveal information in 
the public market and ameliorate the problems correlated to excessively powerful banks. 
For instance, powerful banks can impede competition and innovation by colluding with 
firm managers or protect established firms (Hellwig, 1991; Rajan, 1992). Thus, equity 
markets can help reduce the inefficiency related to powerful banks. Levine and Zervos 
(1998) extended their studies by including the stock markets in the analysis of the 
relationship between financial development and growth. Using the cross-country 
regressions for a set of 47 countries from 1976 through 1993, they investigate the effect 
of both stock markets and bank sectors on growth. They concluded that both stock market 
liquidity and banking development benefit economic growth.  In other words, stock 
markets have a significant effect on growth even when entering regressions together with 
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banking development, which implies that stock markets and the bank sector provide 
different financial services.  
Again, since the cross-section regressions did not take into account the potential 
simultaneity bias and unobserved country-specific effects, GMM dynamic panel 
estimators are applied to resolve some of the econometric weaknesses in recent studies. 
Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) apply the GMM method within the tri-variate vector 
augoregression models on 47 countries with annual data for 1980-1995. They found 
support for the leading roles of stock market liquidity and financial intermediaries on 
growth. The size of stock market, in particular, measured as market capitalization, has a 
less important role on output than the liquidity of the stock market, measured as the total 
value traded. Those findings are consistent with the results in Ross Levine and Zervos 
(1998).  
Inspired by previous cross-country and dynamic panel analysis, this paper has 
applied the panel data VAR, with an adaptation of the GMM technique developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) to examine the relationships 
among bank sectors, stock markets and economic growth. The dataset used in both 
Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) ends in 1995, prior to the 
Asian financial crisis. Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) found that the effect of financial 
development on growth in more recent data (1990-2003) is not as strong as it was in the 
previous period (1960-1989). They also pointed out two possible explanations: excessive 
financial development and widespread financial liberalizations. However, they examined 
only the effect of bank sectors on growth. This paper investigates the role of both stock 
markets and bank sectors in growth based on a larger and more recent dataset of 63 
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countries over the period 1990-2005. The empirical results in this paper suggest that bank 
sectors do not have a positive effect on growth in the recent dataset, which is consistent 
with the findings in Rousseau and Wachtel (2011). However, stock market liquidity still 
has a positive and significant effect on growth when the total value traded is used as the 
measure. The other three measures of equity market development, including market 
capitalization, which measures the size of stock markets, do not have significant effects 
on growth. The findings imply that the liquidity of the stock markets is more important 
than the size of the market in accelerating economic growth. When these results are 
compared with the findings in Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), with a dataset covering the 
years 1980-1995, I find that the effect of stock market liquidity on growth is stronger in 
the recent period than in the previous period 1980-1995.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data 
and the measures used to capture the development and characteristics of bank sectors and 
stock markets. Section 3 describes the econometric methodology applied. Section 4 
reports the empirical results from the VAR models. The conclusion and summary are 
presented in Section 5.   
 
Data and Measures of Equity Markets 
To examine the relationship among economic growth, financial intermediaries 
and equity markets, I use per capita real gross domestic product (GDP) to measure 
economic performance. I also choose the most commonly used measure of bank sector 
development, namely the stock of liquid liabilities (M3). This selection allows me to 
focus primarily on the growth effects of several different measures of equity markets. 
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Both real GDP per capita and M3 are continuously available for all 63 countries from the 
2010 edition of World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
The complicated issue in the literature is, of course, measuring stock market 
development. Among a wide array of possibilities, the following four measures are used 
in this paper: market capitalization, the total value traded, listed domestic companies and 
the turnover ratio. Market capitalization represents the total market value of a given 
country’s outstanding shares, which equals the product of the share price and the number 
of shares outstanding (shares that have been authorized, issued and purchased by 
investors) for all stocks traded. The total value traded refers to the total value of shares 
traded in a given country, which equals the product of market price and the number of 
traded shares. The term “listed domestic companies” refers to the total number of 
companies (that are domestically incorporated, according to the definition from World 
Development Indicators) listed in a given country’s stock market. The turnover ratio is 
another measure of development of the equity market, which equals the ratio of total 
value of shares traded during a period and the average market capitalization for that 
period. Market capitalization and listed domestic companies reflect the size of the equity 
market. The total value traded reflects two aspects of the stock market: size and liquidity. 
The turnover ratio measures the share liquidity. Liquidity is particularly important in 
stock markets. The ability to sell the equity easily and quickly can help build investor 
confidence and thus attract more investment for the domestic country. Based on liquidity 
and its interaction with market size, the total value traded is regarded as the best measure 
of stock market development.  
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 However, there is one potential problem in measuring stock market activity: both 
market capitalization and the total value traded increase when the local share price 
increases. For instance, stock price increases largely when the market anticipates a large 
profit. This price rise will affect the level of both market capitalization and the total value 
traded, without any change in the number of shares outstanding, the number of shares 
traded or the transaction costs. In other words, the size and the liquidity of the equity 
markets, or the financial depth, will not change with the increase in stock prices. One way 
to deal with the influence of the stock price effect is to deflate these two measures with 
the U.S. dollar-equivalent local share price indexes for individual country
5
. Such 
deflation is particular important since it can filter the effect of the “forward-looking” 
stock prices.  For comparison, the turnover ratio, which is another measure of liquidity of 
stock market and will not be affected by the price effect, is also included in the analysis.   
Another potential problem with the measures of stock market and financial 
intermediaries is that growth may be correlated to those measures. I apply the GMM 
method within panel data VAR systems to ameliorate these endogeneity problems.  
Market capitalization, the total value traded, listed domestic companies and the 
turnover ratio data are taken from the 2010 edition of World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators for all 63 countries. Market capitalization and the total value traded are 
measured in current U.S. dollars. To express these two measures in real terms, I deflated 
them with the US dollar-equivalent local share price indices for individual countries. The 
local share price indexes for all the 63 countries are taken from the International Finance 
Corporation’s (IFC) Global Stock Markets Factbook (Or Emerging Stock Markets 
                                                          
5
 According to Rousseau and Wachtel (2000), U.S. dollar-equivalent local share price indexes are 
a better deflator than the general price level such as the GDP deflator.  
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Factbook before 2001), and the exchange rates for each individual country are from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Thus, in the resulting panel VARs, I use real value in 
per capita terms. The selection of countries and time periods is based on the availability 
of data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the International 
Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Global Stock Markets Factbook.  
Previous empirical studies (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 
2000) suggest that both financial intermediaries and stock market have positive effects on 
growth. This paper focuses only on the effects of different measures of equity markets by 
applying the VAR model to a more recent and wider dataset. 63 countries are included in 
the dataset and the period analyzed here is 1990 to 2005
6
. 
 
Methodology 
The econometric method used to assess the relationships among economic growth, 
financial intermediaries and equity markets is panel data VAR, with an adaptation of the 
GMM technique developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995).   
There are clear advantages in using panel data, which contains multiple 
observational units for multiple periods, allowing us to take advantage of information 
available in both the cross section and time series, especially when the time dimension is 
relatively small. Most of the recent empirical studies in the growth literature take non-
                                                          
6
 The 63 countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cote d’lvoire, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United  States, 
Vietnam and Zimbabwe.  
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overlapping, five-year averages or ten-year averages of annual data. The average can 
characterize the steady state relationship between growth and other explanatory variables, 
but may filter out some potentially useful information contained in the annual time series. 
Further, five-year averaging also results in an 80 percent reduction of the number of 
observations. The time period under analysis in this paper is 1990 to 2005. 16 
observations of annual data are used; however, there are only 3 five-year averages 
observations. The system GMM method further decreases the number of time series 
observations available for the estimation since the differences and lags of the variables 
are involved. To maximize the use of the time and cross-country dimensions of available 
data sets, I therefore use a panel with annual data.  
In a panel of N countries for T years, the tri-variate vector autoregressions with 
fixed effects take the form 
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where ti,y is the measure of economic growth (real GDP per capita) for country i at time t, 
ti,m is real liquid liabilities per capita (M3), and ti,s is a measure of equity market 
development (market capitalization, the total value traded, listed domestic companies or 
the turnover ratio), i is a country-specific fixed effect, t is a time-fixed effect, ti, is a 
random disturbance that approximates the normal distribution, and k is the lag order. I 
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assume that the error term ti,  
is orthogonal to the fixed and time effects as well as the 
lagged values of the endogenous variables, and that they are not serially correlated. I use 
the fixed effects model instead of random effects since i are likely to represent omitted 
country-specific characteristics that are correlated with the other explanatory variables. 
Time effects account for the trending behavior in the system variables. 
As to the variables on the right hand side of equation (1), all the lagged values of 
the dependent variables are potentially endogenous. The presence of fixed effects in a 
data set with a small time dimension is also known to lead to biased estimates in the least 
squared dummy variable (LSDV) regression. However, system GMM estimation can 
ameliorate these problems. To carry out this strategy, I write the regression equation as a 
dynamic panel model, take the first-differences to remove unobserved time-invariant 
country-specific effects, and then instrument the independent variables using the 
predetermined lags of the system. 
After taking first-differences, the first equation in the VAR (1a) becomes 
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(2)                        
The other equations in the VAR system can be similarly differenced. In equation 
(2), the country dummies have been differenced out, and the only remaining endogeneity 
problem is caused by correlation between the first lags of the system variables and the 
new error term ).( 1,,  titi   
Under the assumption that the error term ti,  
is not serially 
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correlated, the difference GMM dynamic panel estimator uses the following moment 
conditions to deliver the coefficient estimates: 
,0)](E[y 1,,j-t,i  titi         for T,3,.....,t2;j                                     (3) 
,0)](E[m 1,,j-t,i  titi        for T,3,.....,t2;j                         (4)                          
,0)](E[s 1,,j-t,i  titi        
for T.3,.....,t2;j 
                                   
(5)
 
There are statistical shortcomings with this first-difference GMM estimator. 
Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that persistent 
explanatory variables over time can make lagged levels weak instruments for the 
regression equations in differences. In small samples, such weak instruments can bias the 
coefficients. To reduce the potential biases and imprecision with the first-difference 
estimator, I use the system GMM estimator that combines the regression in differences 
with a regression in levels (Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
Lagged differences of the related explanatory variables are used as instruments for the 
regression in levels, while lags of the related explanatory variables are instruments for the 
regression in the differences shown above. 
 
The additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are: 
 
,0)]()E[(y ,1,j-t,i   tiijtiy         for j=1                                             (6) 
 
,0)]()E[(m ,1,j-t,i   tiijtim   
       for j=1                                            (7) 
 
,0)]()E[(s ,1,j-t,i   tiijtis         
for j=1.                                           (8) 
Two types of tests are used to examine the consistency of the system GMM 
estimator. The first type includes the Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identification, 
which test the joint validity of the instruments by examining the moment conditions used 
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in the estimation.
7
 The null hypothesis is that the instrument set is valid and that the 
model is not over-identified. The second type is the AR test, which examines whether 
there is serial correlation in the error terms. The test depends on large N and relatively 
small T, and has a null hypothesis of no serial correlation. I check for both first-order and 
second-order serial correlation.  
 
Empirical Results 
1. Economic Growth, Financial Intermediaries and Equity Markets 
 Treating market capitalization, the total value traded, the number of listed 
domestic companies and the turnover ratio as four different measures of equity markets 
development, I estimate four tri-variate VAR models. The results for these models are 
shown in table 21, table 22, table 23 and table 24, respectively. As mentioned in section 2, 
GDP and liquid liabilities are in per capita constant 2000 US dollars.  Market 
capitalization and the total value traded are also in per capita terms and are deflated by 
US dollar-equivalent local share price indexes for each individual country.  
 To indicate the size and the direction of the causal effects, I report the 
coefficients on the k lags of each of the explanatory variables.  Two lags are included in 
each VAR in this paper, and the selection of the number of lags is based on the results of 
a series of nested likelihood ratio tests. The Sargan test examines the joint validity of the 
instruments, and the AR tests examine the serial correlation of error terms. Those two 
tests together determine the consistency of the GMM estimators. Crucially, second-order 
serial correlation should be absent and the instrument set should not be over-identified.  
                                                          
7
 Only the results of Sargan tests are reported in this paper, since the Hansen test can be greatly 
weakened by the proliferation of instrument. 
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Table 21 reports the relationship among real GDP per capita, real liquid liabilities 
per capita and share price adjusted market capitalization per capita. The coefficients of 
the first two lags of each explanatory variable are reported, with the p-value in 
parentheses. Each column reports the results corresponded to equations (1a), (1b), and 
(1c) in section 3. The cumulative coefficients of liquid liabilities and market 
capitalization in the output equation are not significant. These suggest that both financial 
intermediaries and equity markets did not have significant effects on growth during the 
period 1990 to 2005. Although the effect of financial intermediaries on growth has been 
well-established in the empirical literature, Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) point out that 
the finance-growth nexus is weaker in recent data (1990-2003) than in the original data 
for the period 1960 to 1989. The result that liquid liabilities do not have a significant 
effect on growth is consistent with the findings in Rousseau and Wachtel (2011). P-
values for the Granger causality test of each explanatory variable and Sargan tests are 
reported in the last four rows. The Sargan tests indicate that the instruments are valid and 
that the specifications are not over-identified. By construction, the differenced error term 
could be first-order serially correlated, while the second-order serial correlation should be 
absent. The AR (1) test has a p-value of zero and the AR (2) test has a p-value of 0.348 
for output equation in table 21, an outcome that indicates that the results cannot be 
rejected due to the serial correlation problem.  
Equation 2 and equation 3 use liquid liabilities (M3) per capita and market 
capitalization per capita as the dependent variables, respectively.  Real GDP has a 
positive and significant effect on both liquid liabilities and market capitalization. These  
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Table 21. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Liquid 
Liabilities (M3) and Market Capitalization, 1990-2005 
  GDP M3 MCAP 
 
   
GDP-1 1.1802** -0.0606 0.0233 
 
(0.0000) (0.8960) (0.8740) 
GDP-2 -0.1581 0.1047 -0.0167 
 
(0.4930) (0.8280) (0.9120) 
M3-1 0.0591 0.9444** -0.1688 
 
(0.6700) (0.0000) (0.2700) 
M3-2 -0.0637 0.0446 0.1689 
 
(0.6410) (0.1890) (0.2680) 
MCAP-1 -0.2581 1.6967** 0.6914** 
 
(0.7380) (0.0030) (0.0000) 
MCAP-2 0.0278 -1.6702** -0.0646 
 
(0.8360) (0.0000) (0.7200) 
    AR (1) 0.0000 0.0610 0.2900 
AR (2) 0.3480 0.6890 0.7420 
 
   
Significance levels 
   
F-GDP 0.0000 0.0038 0.0514 
F-M3 0.3820 0.0000 0.4932 
F-MCAP 0.6933 0.0004 0.0000 
 
   
Sargan test 0.4660 0.2370 0.8270 
        
Note: The table reports coefficients from system GMM estimation for two lags of each 
system variable in a three-variable VAR, with the p-values in parentheses. The symbols * 
and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
Each column corresponds to Equation (1a), (1b) and (1c) in the text. P-values for 
Granger-causality tests and the Sargan test are reported in the last four rows. Year 
dummies are included in the equations but are not reported. GDP and liquid liabilities are 
both in per capita constant 2000 U.S. dollars.  MCAP (market capitalization per capita) is 
adjusted by US dollar equivalent local share price indices.  
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suggest the presence of feedback from GDP to the banking sector and stock market 
development. In addition, market capitalization has a positive and significant effect on 
liquid liabilities, while liquid liabilities do not have a significant effect on market 
capitalization. In other words, stock markets have a unidirectional effect on financial 
intermediaries. The stock market is a place where shares are issued and traded at an 
agreed price. Market capitalization, which equals the product of the share price and the 
number of shares outstanding for all stocks traded, is a measure of the size of the stock 
market. Market capitalization has a positive effect on liquid liabilities, an outcome 
meaning that countries with better development of stock markets also have more highly 
developed financial intermediaries. Since equation 2 and 3 also pass the specification 
tests, i.e., the Sargan test and AR tests, the system GMM estimator is consistent and the 
specification is valid.  
In tables 22, table 23 and table 24, I repeat the analysis using total value traded, 
the number of listed domestic companies and the turnover ratio as the measure of stock 
market development, respectively. All three systems pass the specification tests defined 
above with only one exception, but that exception is a result that may weaken the 
findings in this paper.  
In table 22, the cumulative effects of liquid liabilities on real GDP per capita are 
positive but not significant, while the total value traded has a positive and significant 
effect on GDP.  The total value traded contains components of both the size and the 
liquidity of the equity market. These results suggest that, in the recent period of 1990 to 
2005, the real sector might have benefited more from the equity market than from 
financial intermediaries. In addition, when the results are compared with the findings in  
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Table 22. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Liquid 
Liabilities (M3) and Value Traded, 1990-2005 
 
  GDP M3 VT 
 
   
GDP-1 1.4311** 0.3435 -0.0500 
 
(0.0000) (0.7230) (0.8150) 
GDP-2 -0.4160** -0.2996 0.0642 
 
(0.0000) (0.7620) (0.7710) 
M3-1 0.0216 0.9509** -0.1353** 
 
(0.1050) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
M3-2 -0.0252* 0.0411 0.1336** 
 
(0.0680) (0.2830) (0.0000) 
VT-1 -0.3045** -0.0808 -0.3052 
 
(0.0090) (0.9430) (0.4650) 
VT-2 0.3667** -1.2483 0.5040** 
 
(0.0000) (0.2730) (0.0250) 
    AR (1) 0.0000 0.5430 0.0660 
AR (2) 0.2100 0.9350 0.2420 
 
   
Significance levels 
   
F-GDP 0.0000 0.0079 0.0324 
F-M3 0.1285 0.0000 0.0006 
F-VT 0.0000 0.0000 0.0626 
 
   
Sargan test 0.8370 0.0760 0.2750 
        
Note: The table reports coefficients from system GMM estimation for two lags of each 
system variable in a three-variable VAR, with the p-values in parentheses. The symbols * 
and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
Each column corresponds to Equation (1a), (1b) and (1c) in the text. P-values for 
Granger-causality tests and the Sargan test are reported in the last four rows. Year 
dummies are included in the equations but are not reported. GDP and liquid liabilities are 
both in per capita constant 2000 U.S. dollars. VT (total value traded per capita) is 
adjusted by US dollar equivalent local share price indices.  
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Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) with a dataset covering the period of 1980-1995, I find that 
the effect of stock market liquidity on growth is stronger in the most recent period than in 
the previous period, 1980-1995. 
According to the results from table 22, real GDP has positive and significant 
feedback on both liquid liabilities and the total value traded. As to the relationship 
between liquid liabilities and the total value traded, the latter has a negative effect on 
liquid liabilities, while liquid liabilities also have a negative and significant feedback on 
the total value traded.  The stock market is one important channel for companies to raise 
additional capital for expansion by issuing ownership shares of the company. In recent 
decades, with the rapid development of equity markets, a large proportion of savings 
moved to the more risky stock market from the traditional banking deposits. The liquidity 
of equity markets allows investors to quickly and easily buy and sell securities, which is 
an attractive characteristic compared to other less liquid investment options, such as real 
estate. Equity market is a substitute for financial intermediaries with respect to both 
attracting savings and obtaining extra capital for firms. The total value traded, 
representing both size and liquidity of the stock market, has a negative effect on liquid 
liabilities. In other words, a more liquid equity market can attract more savings from the 
traditional banking sector and provide more capital for firms with financial constraint. In 
summary, the total value traded has a positive and significant effect on real GDP and real 
GDP has feedback on both liquid liabilities and the total value traded.  
 Tables 23 and table 24 present the results for the VAR systems with the number 
of listed domestic companies and the turnover ratio as the measure of equity market 
development, respectively. As in the previous analysis, two lags are included in each  
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Table 23. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Liquid 
Liabilities (M3) and Listed Domestic Companies, 1990-2005 
 
  GDP M3 LC 
 
   
GDP-1 1.4259** 0.2970 -0.0262 
 
(0.0000) (0.4030) (0.2820) 
GDP-2 -0.4102** -0.2677 0.0257 
 
(0.0050) (0.4640) (0.2920) 
M3-1 0.0214 0.9687** 0.0319 
 
(0.1820) (0.0000) (0.4840) 
M3-2 -0.0251 0.0259 -0.0314 
 
(0.1170) (0.4510) (0.4940) 
LC-1 -0.0809 -0.3091 1.2407** 
 
(0.1750) (0.2410) (0.0000) 
LC-2 0.0785 0.2883 -0.2437 
 
(0.1850) (0.2900) (0.1830) 
    AR (1) 0.0020 0.0490 0.0450 
AR (2) 0.1870 0.7230 0.2220 
 
   
Significance levels 
   
F-GDP 0.0000 0.0053 0.2731 
F-M3 0.1810 0.0000 0.0842 
F-LC 0.3887 0.3892 0.0000 
 
   
Sargan test 0.2260 0.1220 0.8020 
        
Note: The table reports coefficients from system GMM estimation for two lags of each 
system variable in a three-variable VAR, with the p-values in parentheses. The symbols * 
and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
Each column corresponds to Equation (1a), (1b) and (1c) in the text. P-values for 
Granger-causality tests and the Sargan test are reported in the last four rows. Year 
dummies are included in the equations but are not reported. GDP and liquid liabilities are 
both in per capita constant 2000 U.S. dollars. LC represents the number of listed 
domestic companies.  
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Table 24. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Liquid 
Liabilities (M3) and Turnover Ratio, 1990-2005 
 
  GDP M3 TR 
 
   
GDP-1 1.3970** 0.0369 -0.0085 
 
(0.0000) (0.9470) (0.3220) 
GDP-2 -0.3813** 0.0123 0.0090 
 
(0.0000) (0.9830) (0.3060) 
M3-1 0.0172 0.9210** 0.0007 
 
(0.2480) (0.0000) (0.1420) 
M3-2 -0.0213 0.0609* -0.0009* 
 
(0.1480) (0.0970) (0.0930) 
TR-1 0.1239 1.1200 0.6859** 
 
(0.7810) (0.2710) (0.0000) 
TR-2 0.1266 -1.2452 0.2043** 
 
(0.7080) (0.2120) (0.0040) 
    AR (1) 0.0010 0.0600 0.0450 
AR (2) 0.4800 0.4530 0.3730 
 
   
Significance levels 
   
F-GDP 0.0000 0.0128 0.0396 
F-M3 0.1313 0.0000 0.1767 
F-TR 0.1929 0.4522 0.0000 
 
   
Sargan test 0.5090 0.6050 0.7190 
        
Note: The table reports coefficients from system GMM estimation for two lags of each 
system variable in a three-variable VAR, with the p-values in parentheses. The symbols * 
and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
Each column corresponds to Equation (1a), (1b) and (1c) in the text. P-values for 
Granger-causality tests and the Sargan test are reported in the last four rows. Year 
dummies are included in the equations but are not reported. GDP and liquid liabilities are 
both in per capita constant 2000 U.S. dollars. TR represents turnover ratio.  
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VAR system. The coefficients on the lags of each explanatory variable are reported, with 
the p-values in parentheses. Again, both systems pass the Sargan and AR tests.  Both the 
number of listed domestic companies and the turnover ratio do not have a significant 
effect on real GDP, while in these two VAR systems GDP has feedback on liquid 
liabilities. In addition, real GDP has a positive effect on the turnover ratio as shown in the 
regression results in table 24. In summary, I have compared the effect of the following 
four measures of stock market development: market capitalization, the total value traded, 
listed domestic companies and the turnover ratio. Only the total value traded has a 
positive and significant effect on real sector development. The total value traded is also 
regarded as the best measure of stock markets development as discussed in Rousseau and 
Watchel (2000).  
2. Different Effects of Market Capitalization and Total Value Traded on Growth 
To further compare the different effects of market capitalization and the total 
value traded, I use a four-variable VAR specification with real GDP per capita, real liquid 
liabilities per capita, share price adjusted market capitalization per capita and the total 
value traded per capita. Table 25 presents the results for the four-variable VAR system. 
As in the previous analysis, two lags are included in this VAR system. The cumulative 
coefficients of the two lags of each explanatory variable are reported, with the p-values of 
the joint significance tests for block exogeneity in parentheses. The results are consistent 
with the previous findings in tri-variate VAR systems. The total value traded continues to 
have a positive effect on real output at a one percent level, and market capitalization does 
not have a significant effect on output as in the tri-variate VAR. In other words, the 
results suggest that stock market liquidity is more important than stock market size in  
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Table 25. Panel System GMM Estimates for VAR with per Capita Real GDP, Liquid 
Liabilities (M3), Market Capitalization and Value Traded, 1990-2005 
 
  GDP M3 MCAP VT 
     
GDP 1.0161** 0.0112* 0.0062** -0.0125 
 
(0.0000) (0.0679) (0.0480) (0.5211) 
M3 -0.0035 0.9984** 0.0003** 0.0025 
 
(0.1529) (0.0000) (0.0141) (0.3267) 
MCAP -0.1485 0.3586** 0.7266** 0.6746** 
 
(0.7023) (0.0019) (0.0000) (0.0002) 
VT 0.0910** -0.7130 -0.1427** 0.4990** 
 
(0.0000) (0.2048) (0.0003) (0.0000) 
     
AR (1)  0.0000 0.6330 0.1320 0.1790 
AR (2) 0.2210 0.9700 0.8040 0.6190 
     
Sargan test 0.7030 0.0920 0.1680 0.3210 
          
Note: The table reports coefficients from system GMM estimation for two lags of each 
system variable in a four-variable VAR, with the p-values for Granger-casualty tests in 
parentheses. The symbols * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent and 5 
percent levels, respectively. Each column reports the results from one equation. P-values 
for the Sargan test are reported in the last row. Year dummies are included in the 
equations but are not reported. GDP and liquid liabilities are both in per capita constant 
2000 U.S. dollars. MCAP (market capitalization per capita) and VT (total value traded 
per capita) are both adjusted by US dollar equivalent local share price indices.  
 
 
promoting economic growth.  These findings are consistent with the studies in Rousseau 
and Watchel (2000) for a set of 47 countries with annual data for the period 1980 to 1995.  
Although they find that both market capitalization and total value traded have a positive 
effect on growth in the tri-variate VAR model, the effect of market capitalization on 
growth is no longer statistically significant in the four-variable VAR system, including 
both the total value traded and market capitalization measures. The findings in this paper 
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further confirm the belief in Rousseau and Watchel, based on a larger and more recent 
dataset, that stock market liquidity is the channel through which the stock market affects 
growth.  
Furthermore, output has a feedback on both liquid liabilities and market 
capitalization, a finding that is also consistent with previous results in tri-variate VAR 
systems. The coefficient of the value traded is negative and significant at a one percent 
level in equation 3, which suggests that the greater the liquidity of stock market, the 
smaller the total market value of a given country’s outstanding shares. Liquidity 
liabilities have a positive and statistically significant effect on both market capitalization 
and the total value traded. Although financial intermediaries do not have a direct positive 
effect on growth, they may still influence growth through the equity market. The 
development of the banking sector is important for the stock market, especially at the 
early stage of development. For instance, at the establishment stage, the stock market can 
benefit from the support services of the banking sector. Stock markets, which allow 
investors to quickly and easily buy and sell securities, have become an important channel 
for companies to raise additional capital for expansion by issuing shares of company 
ownership. In recent decades, with the rapid development of equity markets, a large 
proportion of savings moved to the more risky stock market from the traditional banking 
deposits. Equity market is a substitute for financial intermediaries with respect to 
attracting savings. The results in this paper are also consistent with the views that equity 
markets provide different financial services from financial intermediaries and have 
independent impacts on growth.  
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Summary of the Chapter 
Utilizing four different measures of equity market development for 63 countries 
for the time period of 1990 to 2005, and applying the panel data VAR model with an 
adaptation of the GMM method, I find that equity market development promotes real 
economic growth only when the total value traded is used as the measure. The other three 
measures of equity market development, however, do not have significant effects on 
growth.  
To further compare the different effects of market capitalization and the total 
value traded, I apply a four-variable VAR specification with real GDP, real liquid 
liabilities, share price adjusted market capitalization and the total value traded. The 
results are consistent with the results in tri-variate VAR systems. The total value traded 
continues to have an effect on real output at a one percent level, and market capitalization 
does not have a significant effect on output. These findings imply that stock market 
liquidity is more important than the size of the market in accelerating economic growth. 
When these results are compared with the findings in Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) with 
a dataset covering the period of 1980-1995, I find that the effect of stock market liquidity 
on growth is stronger in the most recent period than in the previous period 1980-1995. On 
the other hand, the effect of stock market size on growth is not as significant as in the 
previous period. In addition, the total value traded has a negative and significant effect on 
market capitalization, an outcome suggesting that the greater the stock market liquidity, 
the smaller the total market value of a given country’s outstanding share.
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